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. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 This matter comes on before this Court on four 
consolidated appeals and cross-appeals from an order of the 
District Court dated March 29, 2007, and entered on March 30, 
2007, denying defendants’ motion for summary judgment and 
granting in part and denying in part plaintiffs’ cross-motion for 
summary judgment.  See Shaver v. Siemens Corp., No. 
2:02cv1424, 2007 WL 1006681 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2007).  
Plaintiffs, now the appellees/cross-appellants in this appeal,1
                                                 
1As a matter of convenience, we refer to plaintiffs simply as 
“appellees.”   
 
Ronald Shaver, William Whitney, Joe Fedele, Ralph Riberich, 
and Anthony Katz, on behalf of themselves and others similarly 
situated, brought this class action against defendants, now 
appellants/cross-appellees, Siemens Corporation (“Siemens”), 
appellees’ former employer, and its retirement plans, Siemens 
Westinghouse Retirement Plan for Union Employees and 
Siemens Westinghouse Retirement Plan, alleging that those 
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entities violated the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
of 1974 (“ERISA”) by refusing to provide appellees with 
Permanent Job Separation pension benefits (“PJS benefits”) 
when Siemens terminated their employment.  Appellees’ action 
has been partially successful in the District Court but remains 
unresolved as to the rest of the case.  For the reasons that follow, 
we will reverse on one of Siemens’ appeals to the extent that the 
District Court denied it summary judgment for we conclude that 
Siemens was entitled to summary judgment on the entire case 
with respect to all appellees, and we will remand the case to the 
District Court for entry of judgment in favor of Siemens and its 
retirement plans.  Entry of the order on the remand will bring 
this litigation to a close with respect to the substantive matters at 
issue.2
  
  
 
II.  FACTUAL and PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
 On November 14, 1997, Westinghouse Electric 
Corporation (“Westinghouse”)3
                                                 
2It is possible that the District Court will need to enter orders on 
some housekeeping matters such as the imposition of costs. 
 agreed to sell its Power 
Generation Business Unit (“PGBU”) to Siemens in a transaction 
to be effectuated through an Asset Purchase Agreement 
(“APA”).  There was, however, a delay in the consummation of 
the transaction, and Siemens and Westinghouse did not execute 
 
3Subsequently, Westinghouse changed its name to CBS, Inc., 
and it is now known as Viacom, Inc.  
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the APA until approximately nine months later, on August 19, 
1998.  As the APA contemplated, Siemens hired all 
Westinghouse PGBU employees who, on August 19, 1998, had 
been working actively, were on vacation, or were on short-term 
disability (“legacy employees”).  Appellees are 227 legacy 
employees who transferred employment from Westinghouse to 
Siemens. 
 
 At the time that Siemens and Westinghouse executed the 
APA, Westinghouse sponsored and maintained a defined benefit 
pension plan for its employees, including the soon-to-be legacy 
employees (the “Westinghouse Plan”).  Under section 19 of the 
Westinghouse Plan, employees who satisfied certain age and 
service requirements, but did not qualify for normal retirement 
benefits, and who were terminated by an “Employer, an 
Affiliated Entity, or Excluded Unit because of job movement or 
product line relocation or location closedown” were entitled to 
PJS benefits.  J.A. 292, 345.  Stated succinctly, PJS benefits 
provide for payment of an employee’s normal retirement benefit 
without actuarial reduction prior to normal retirement age, an 
additional monthly payment of $10.00 multiplied by the 
employee’s years of credited service if the employee’s special 
retirement date4
                                                 
4A plan participant’s special retirement date under section 19 of 
the Westinghouse Plan is the first day of the month following 
the month in which Westinghouse terminates the participant’s 
employment due to job movement, product line relocation, or 
location closedown.   
 was on or before January 1, 1995, and an 
additional monthly payment of $100.00 if the employee had 25 
years of eligibility service and his special retirement date was on 
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or before January 1, 1995.  See id. 345-50.  As we later will 
explain, it is highly significant that the Westinghouse Plan 
defined an “Employer, Affiliated Entity, or Excluded Unit” as 
Westinghouse or any Westinghouse subsidiary or joint venture 
participating in the Westinghouse Plan.  Id.
 
 284, 288, 292.  The 
definition did not, however, include any future employer, here 
Siemens, of Westinghouse employees.   
 The Westinghouse Plan also contained two critical 
express limitations on the availability of PJS benefits: (1) a 
provision providing that “in no event shall a Permanent Job 
Separation occur if an Employee is offered continued 
employment by . . . a successor employer,” and (2) a so-called 
“sunset provision” providing that “[i]n no event shall a 
Permanent Job Separation occur after August 31, 1998.”  Id.
 
 
293.  Thus, in the absence of an amendment of the 
Westinghouse Plan, the plan would not provide for PJS benefits 
to an employee offered employment by a successor to 
Westinghouse, as happened here, or by reason of a separation 
after August 31, 1998, as was also the case here.    
The APA included many specific provisions governing 
the pensions and benefits of the legacy employees, which, so far 
as germane to this appeal, we explain in more detail below.  At 
its broadest, however, the APA required that Siemens establish a 
defined benefit pension plan for the legacy employees “that 
contain[ed] terms and conditions that are substantially identical 
with respect to all substantive provisions to those of the 
Westinghouse Pension Plan as in effect as of the Closing Date” 
of the APA and that Siemens was to provide “compensation and 
benefit plans and arrangements which in the aggregate are 
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comparable” to those of the Westinghouse Plan as of the closing 
date.  Id.
 
 137-38.  Thus, Westinghouse and Siemens 
contemplated that the pension benefits for legacy employees 
essentially would continue unabated after consummation of the 
sale of the PGBU.  There is, however, no suggestion in the APA 
or in any other document elsewhere in the record that 
Westinghouse and Siemens contemplated that the consummation 
of the sale would result in enhancement of the legacy 
employees’ pension benefits. 
 Although Westinghouse and Siemens did not execute the 
APA until August 19, 1998, prior to that date they adopted an 
amendment to the APA that provided that the closing date of the 
APA, though only for the purpose of pensions and benefits, 
would be September 1, 1998.5
                                                 
5 The District Court found and the parties agree that Siemens 
and Westinghouse amended the APA to alter the closing date for 
pension and benefit purposes to September 1, 1998.  In reality, 
however, the amendment was more specific than that and 
provided that “[a]ll references to ‘Closing Date’ in [s]ections 
5.5(d), (e) and (h) shall be changed to September 1, 1998.”  J.A. 
154.  In fact, however, there are provisions of the APA that deal 
with pensions and benefits that are not within the sections 
enumerated above.  In particular, sections 5.5(a) and 2.3(a) 
implicate pensions and benefits.  In light of the parties’ long-
standing agreement as to the import of the amendment, however, 
and for ease of reference, we insert September 1, 1998, as the 
closing date for all APA provisions dealing with pensions and 
benefits.  We note, however, that the precise closing date of the 
APA is potentially relevant only as to our discussion in section 
  In the same amendment 
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Westinghouse and Siemens also amended the APA to provide 
that Westinghouse would amend its pension plan to offer the 
legacy employees, though only for benefit accrual purposes, 
credit for service and compensation from August 19 through 
August 31, 1998, even though Siemens would become their 
employer as of August 19.  In turn, Siemens agreed not to 
terminate any legacy employee other than for cause prior to 
September 1, 1998, and agreed that if it nevertheless did so it 
would “reimburse [Westinghouse] for any actuarial pension loss 
caused by any such termination.”  Id.
  
 156.  Thereafter, 
Westinghouse amended its plan to reflect this amendment to the 
APA.   
On October 29, 1998, Siemens adopted separate but 
virtually identical defined benefit pension plans for union and 
non-union employees, which were made effective retroactively 
to September 1, 1998, the plans thereby becoming activated as 
of the time the Westinghouse Plan no longer would give the 
legacy employees credit for service and compensation.  
Consequently, the consummation of the Westinghouse-Siemens 
transaction left the legacy employees in the same position in 
which they had been prior to the closing of the transaction with 
regard to PJS benefits because under the Westinghouse Plan 
                                                                                                             
V(B)(3)(b) of this opinion concerning whether the APA 
contractually required Siemens to offer PJS benefits.  We thus 
only address the disparate closing dates in that section of our 
decision and note that inserting August 19, 1998, as the closing 
date of the APA into sections 5.5(a) and 2.3(a) does not alter the 
outcome of this case.   
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separation from service after August 31, 1998, could not result 
in a terminated employee being eligible for PJS benefits.   
 
 As we have indicated, notwithstanding the sale of the 
PGBU to Siemens and the adoption of the Siemens Plans, after 
execution of the APA and to this day, the Westinghouse Plan 
has remained in existence and it continues to provide legacy 
employees the pension benefits they accrued under the 
Westinghouse Plan.  Legacy employees who qualify for benefits 
thus receive two pension payments: one from the Westinghouse 
Plan for benefits accrued prior to September 1, 1998, and 
another from a Siemens Plan for benefits accrued from 
September 1, 1998 forward.6
 
   
In 1999, Siemens closed certain PGBU facilities and 
consequently terminated the employment of numerous legacy 
employees, including the appellees in this case.  Upon their 
termination, 207 of the 227 appellees signed severance 
agreements in which they released Siemens from liability and 
promised not to sue it for any claims related to or arising out of 
their employment or termination.  In exchange for their signing 
the agreement, Siemens paid the signatories varying amounts of 
severance pay.  Though the validity of the releases was a major 
issue in the District Court, as will be seen we need not address 
that issue on this appeal.  Notwithstanding having executed 
these releases, in March 2002 appellees submitted claims to the 
                                                 
6As explained below, however, there are certain benefits which 
are considered to have “accrued” for purposes of ERISA section 
204(g) prior to September 1, 1998, for which Westinghouse is 
no longer liable.   
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Siemens Plans for PJS benefits, but the Siemens Plans’ 
administrative committees denied those claims on the ground 
that neither Plan provided for PJS benefits, an undoubtedly 
correct decision so far as the terms of the Siemens Plans were 
concerned.   
 
On August 15, 2002, appellees filed a complaint in the 
District Court against Siemens and the Siemens Plans, alleging 
that those entities’ denial of their claims for PJS benefits 
violated ERISA.  The Court assigned the case to a Magistrate 
Judge for pretrial proceedings in accordance with the Magistrate 
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A).  Following discovery, the parties 
filed cross-motions for summary judgment, which led to the 
Magistrate Judge’s filing a report and recommendation on 
December 13, 2005, with the District Court.  After the parties 
filed objections and responses, the Court entered the order 
which is the subject of this appeal.   
 
 The Magistrate Judge recommended that the District 
Court grant appellees’ motion as to the 20 class members who 
had not signed releases (the “Non-Release Plaintiffs”) and grant 
Siemens’ motion as to the 207 members who had signed releases 
(the “Release Plaintiffs”).  The Magistrate Judge concluded that 
Siemens violated ERISA sections 208, 29 U.S.C. § 1058, and 
204(g), 29 U.S.C. § 1054(g), a decision she based on two 
theories which we address in detail below.  The Magistrate 
Judge determined, however, that Siemens had satisfied its initial 
burden with respect to the Release Plaintiffs of proving the 
waivers’ validity and further determined that appellees had 
failed to provide evidence that they did not knowingly and 
voluntarily execute the waivers.  Consequently, the Magistrate 
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Judge recommended that the Court grant summary judgment in 
Siemens’ favor with respect to the Release Plaintiffs.  Thus, the 
gravamen of the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation was that 
Siemens wrongfully denied all appellees PJS benefits but to the 
extent that appellees had waived their PJS claims by executing 
the severance agreements including releases of their PJS claims 
Siemens avoided liability. 
 
The parties filed cross-objections and responses in the 
District Court to the report and recommendation as both sides 
were satisfied in part and dissatisfied in part with the report and 
recommendation.  On March 29, 2007, the Court granted 
appellees’ summary judgment motion with respect to the Non-
Release Plaintiffs and denied summary judgment to Siemens as 
to both classes of plaintiffs.  Apparently adopting both of the 
Magistrate Judge’s theories of liability, the Court determined 
that Siemens violated ERISA in denying PJS benefits and that in 
the absence of their signing releases all appellees would be 
entitled to PJS benefits.  The Court denied summary judgment to 
appellees as to the Release Plaintiffs, as it concluded that a 
determination of whether they knowingly and voluntarily 
waived their right to bring their claims for PJS benefits required 
a fact-intensive inquiry inappropriate for resolution on summary 
judgment proceedings as there were material disputes of fact on 
the waiver issue.  
 
The District Court entered a final judgment pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) on October 15, 2010, 
awarding the Non-Release Plaintiffs approximately $2 million in 
damages but denying a claim they asserted for certain retiree 
health and life insurance benefits that they contended should 
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accompany PJS benefits.7  On October 15 the Court certified the 
portion of its March 29, 2007 opinion and order denying 
appellees’ motion for summary judgment as to the Release 
Plaintiffs for interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1292(b).  The Court also certified for interlocutory appeal 
Siemens’ appeal from the Court’s denial of its motion for 
summary judgment with respect to the Release Plaintiffs.  The 
Court characterized the issue for the proposed interlocutory 
appeals as whether the Release Plaintiffs’ claim to PJS benefits 
could be waived as a matter of law and, if so, what proof must 
be presented to demonstrate that there had been a valid waiver.  
Both appellees and Siemens petitioned in this Court for 
permission to appeal, and on December 13, 2010, we granted 
both petitions.  These appeals followed.8
 
 
 
 
III.  JURISDICTION and STANDARD of REVIEW 
 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1331 and 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e) and (f).  We have jurisdiction 
                                                 
7Inasmuch as we determine that appellees are not entitled to the 
PJS benefits we do not address their claim that they are entitled 
to attendant health and life insurance benefits.   
 
8The parties filed four separate appeals but we have no need to 
explain their procedural history in more detail as we have 
consolidated them and our opinion in this consolidated case will 
bring these appeals and this litigation in its entirety to a 
substantive close.   
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over the parties’ cross-appeals of the District Court’s entry of 
final judgment as to the Non-Release Plaintiffs pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1291 and over the interlocutory appeals with respect to 
the Release Plaintiffs pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).   
 
 “We exercise plenary review of a district court’s order 
granting or denying summary judgment, applying the same 
standard as the district court . . . .”  Tri-M Grp., LLC v. Sharp, 
638 F.3d 406, 415 (3d Cir. 2011).  We will affirm only if 
“drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving 
party, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . 
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Id. 
(quoting Ruehl v. Viacom, Inc.
 
, 500 F.2d 375, 380 n.6 (3d Cir. 
2007)).  Because the District Court adopted in substance the 
Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation, with the 
modifications we have set forth, in most respects effectively we 
are reviewing the Magistrate Judge’s proposed disposition of the 
case.  We thus reference primarily the Magistrate Judge’s report 
and recommendation rather than the opinion of the District 
Court though to a degree we treat the documents 
interchangeably. 
 
 
IV.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
 
 Due to the complexity of this ERISA case, we think it 
best to set forth the background legal framework that governs 
this matter before we turn to a review of the District Court’s 
disposition of this case.  We start from the core principle that it 
is well-established that “ERISA does not mandate the creation 
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of pension plans.”  Dade v. North Am. Philips Corp., 68 F.3d 
1558, 1561 (3d Cir. 1995).  “Nor does ERISA mandate what 
kind of benefits employers must provide if they choose to have 
such a plan.”  Lockheed Corp. v. Spink, 517 U.S. 882, 887, 116 
S.Ct. 1783, 1788 (1996); see also Smith v. Contini, 205 F.3d 
597, 602 (3d Cir. 2000) (“ERISA neither mandates the creation 
of pension plans nor in general dictates the benefits to be 
afforded once a plan is created.”).  Instead, Congress enacted 
ERISA to ensure that “if a worker has been promised a defined 
pension benefit upon retirement — and if he has fulfilled 
whatever conditions are required to obtain a vested benefit — he 
will actually receive it.”  Spink, 517 U.S. at 887, 116 S.Ct. at 
1788 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Thus, “[o]nly the plan 
itself can create an entitlement to benefits.”  Bellas v. CBS, Inc., 
221 F.3d 517, 522 (3d Cir. 2000).  “Accordingly, we are 
required to enforce the [p]lan as written unless we find a 
provision of ERISA that contains a contrary directive.”  Dade, 
68 F.3d at 1562; see also Smith, 205 F.3d at 602 (same).9
 
 
By their plain terms, the Siemens Plans do not provide 
for PJS benefits.  The Magistrate Judge found, however, that 
ERISA sections 208 and 204(g) controlled the transactions that 
led to the creation of the Siemens Plans and that by reason of 
                                                 
9In point of fact, since Congress originally adopted ERISA it has 
from time to time amended the statute to limit plan sponsors’ 
power to determine the ERISA benefits and collective 
bargaining agreements sometimes also address plans’ benefits.  
But the basic principle that the employer determines the benefits 
remains.   
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those sections appellees are entitled to PJS benefits.  We thus 
turn to those provisions.   
 
ERISA section 208 provides, in relevant part:  
A pension plan may not merge or consolidate 
with, or transfer its assets or liabilities to, any 
other plan after September 2, 1974, unless each 
participant in the plan would (if the plan then 
terminated) receive a benefit immediately after 
the merger, consolidation, or transfer which is 
equal to or greater than the benefit he would have 
been entitled to receive immediately before the 
merger, consolidation, or transfer (if the plan had 
then terminated).  
 
29 U.S.C. § 1058.  In Gillis v. Hoechst Celanese Corp.
 
, 4 F.3d 
1137, 1150 (3d Cir. 1993), then-Judge Alito summarized in his 
concurring opinion the operation of section 208:  
[Section 208 and its Internal Revenue 
Code counterpart, 26 U.S.C. § 414(l)10
                                                 
10“When Title I of ERISA was enacted to impose substantive 
legal requirements on employee pension plans (including the 
anti-cutback rule), Title II of ERISA amended the Internal 
Revenue Code to condition the eligibility of pension plans for 
preferential tax treatment on compliance with many of the Title I 
requirements.”  Central Laborers’ Pension Fund v. Heinz, 541 
U.S. 739, 746, 124 S.Ct. 2230, 2236-37 (2004).  “The result was 
a ‘curious duplicate structure’ with nearly verbatim replication 
in the Internal Revenue Code of whole sections of text from 
] require us 
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to compare (a) the benefits, if any, that the 
[participants] would have received if the 
[original] [p]lan had terminated just before the 
[merger or transfer] . . . with (b) the benefits, if 
any, that the [participants] would have received if 
the [successor] [p]lan had terminated just after the 
[merger or] transfer. 
 
In order to determine the benefits that the 
[participants] would have received upon 
termination of the plans at these two points in 
time, it is necessary to look to Section 4044 of 
ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1344, which prescribes the 
order in which the assets of a single-employer 
defined benefit plan are allocated among 
participants and beneficiaries at termination.  The 
effect of all of these provisions — 26 U.S.C. § 
414(l) and 29 U.S.C. §§ 1058 and 1344 — when 
read together [is] to require that any allocation of 
assets to the [participants’] early retirement 
benefits that would have occurred upon 
termination of the [original] [p]lan just before the 
[merger or] transfer not exceed the allocation of 
                                                                                                             
Title I of ERISA.”  Id., 124 S.Ct. at 2237.   Section 208 is 
replicated in 26 U.S.C. § 414(l) and section 204(g) in 26 U.S.C. 
§ 411(d)(6).  When interpreting ERISA, we thus take guidance 
from the parallel provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, along 
with Treasury regulations and Revenue Rulings implementing 
and interpreting those provisions.   See Gillis, 4 F.3d at 1144.   
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assets to those benefits that would have occurred 
upon termination of the [successor] [p]lan just 
after the [merger or] transfer.   
 
Id.
 
  Thus, section 208 essentially requires that a plan participant 
receive no less benefits upon a hypothetical termination of the 
successor plan just following the merger or transfer of assets or 
liabilities than the participant would have received upon a 
hypothetical termination of his or her original plan just prior to 
the merger or transfer. 
Section 204(g), known as the anti-cutback rule, “prohibits 
an employer from decreasing or eliminating a participant’s 
accrued benefits by plan amendment.”  Bellas, 221 F.3d at 522.  
Thus, section 204(g) follows the principles of section 208 in 
protecting plan participants.  In the case of a defined benefit 
plan, ERISA defines, in a somewhat circular fashion, an 
“accrued benefit” as a participant’s “accrued benefit determined 
under the plan and . . . expressed in the form of an annual 
benefit commencing at normal retirement age.”  29 U.S.C. § 
1002(23)(A).  Because early retirement benefits by definition 
commence prior to normal retirement age, those benefits were 
not considered “accrued” under ERISA prior to 1984.  See 
Bellas, 221 F.3d at 523 n.2 (citing Bencivenga v. Western Pa. 
Teamsters and Emp’rs Pension Fund, 763 F.2d 574, 577 (3d Cir. 
1985)).  In 1984, however, Congress amended section 204(g) 
and extended the protection it afforded to early retirement 
benefits and retirement-type subsidies.  See
 
 Retirement Equity 
Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-397, § 301(a)(2), 98 Stat. 1426, 
1450-51.  As amended, section 204(g) now provides: 
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(g)  Decrease of accrued benefits through 
amendment of plan 
 
(1) The accrued benefit of a participant 
under a plan may not be decreased by an 
amendment of the plan, other than an 
amendment described in section 
1082(d)(2) or 1441 of this title.  
 
(2)  For purposes of paragraph (1), a plan 
amendment which has the effect of –  
 
(A)  eliminating or reducing an 
early retirement benefit or a 
retirement-type subsidy (as defined 
in regulations), or 
 
(B) eliminating an optional form of 
benefit, 
 
with respect to benefits attributable 
to service before the amendment 
shall be treated as reducing accrued 
benefits.  In the case of a 
retirement-type subsidy, the 
preceding sentence shall apply only 
with respect to a participant who 
satisfies (either before or after the 
amendment) the preamendment 
conditions for the subsidy.   
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29 U.S.C. § 1054(g).   
 
Although section 204(g) prohibits cutback of accrued 
benefits by plan amendment, a determination under section 208 
of a participant’s pension and benefits entitlement on a 
hypothetical termination basis requires that a court also consider 
section 204(g) because a plan termination is regarded as an 
“amendment” for the purposes of section 204(g).  See Gillis, 4 
F.3d at 1145.  As Judge Alito observed in his concurring opinion 
in Gillis, “[w]hile neither [s]ection 204(g) of ERISA nor 
[s]ection 414(l) of the Internal Revenue Code expressly states 
that a termination must be regarded as an amendment for these 
purposes,” the Internal Revenue Service has concluded in a 
Revenue Ruling that plan terminations are subject to the 
provisions of section 204(g).  Id. at 1150 (Alito, J., concurring) 
(citing Revenue Ruling 85-6).  Furthermore, the Treasury 
regulations implementing the Internal Revenue Code 
counterpart to ERISA section 204(g), 26 U.S.C. § 411, provide 
that “[t]he prohibition against the reduction or elimination of 
section 411(d)(6) protected benefits already accrued applies to 
plan mergers, spinoffs, transfers, and transactions amending or 
having the effect of amending a plan or plans to transfer plan 
benefits.”  26 C.F.R. § 1.411(d)-4, A-2(a)(3)(i).11
                                                 
11As we observed in Dade, “the legislative history of the 1984 
amendments indicates that Congress intended early retirement 
benefits to have the same protection in a plan termination that 
they would have in an amendment.”  68 F.3d at 1563 n.2 (citing, 
e.g., S. Rep. No. 98-575, at 31, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
2547, 2577) (“Terminated Plans: The bill does not provide an 
exception to the prohibition against reduction of benefits or 
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 Those Treasury regulations apply with equal force to 
section 204(g).  29 U.S.C. § 1202(c) (“Regulations proscribed 
by the Secretary of the Treasury under sections 410(a), 411, and 
412 of Title 26 . . . shall also apply to [their ERISA 
counterparts].”); see also Heinz
 
, 541 U.S. at 746-47, 124 S.Ct. at 
2237 (observing that section 411 regulations are applicable to 
section 204(g)).  Accordingly, a plan participant’s benefits 
protected by section 204(g) under a plan amendment must be 
preserved and funded upon a hypothetical termination under 
section 208 and thus not decreased or eliminated by virtue of a 
plan merger or a transfer of assets or liabilities.    
The present case is unusual in that we already have had 
occasion to consider whether section 204(g) protects the precise 
benefits at issue here.  In Bellas, a former employee brought suit 
against Westinghouse, by then CBS, and the Westinghouse 
Pension Plan, contending that certain amendments to the plan 
that narrowed the class of persons eligible for PJS benefits and 
enacted the sunset provision present also in the Westinghouse 
Plan at issue in this case violated ERISA section 204(g).  221 
F.3d at 520-21.  On interlocutory appeal, we considered whether 
the PJS benefits constituted an early retirement benefit or 
retirement-type subsidy protected by section 204(g).  Id.
                                                                                                             
elimination of benefits options in the case of a terminated plan.  
Accordingly, a plan is not to be considered to have satisfied all 
of its liabilities to participants and beneficiaries until it has 
provided for the payment of contingent liabilities with respect to 
a participant who, after the date of the termination of a plan, 
meets the requirements for a subsidized benefit.”).  
 at 518.  
At that time, the Treasury had not, as section 204(g) 
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contemplated that it would do, promulgated regulations defining 
these terms.  Id.
 
 at 524.   
We first noted that “[b]ecause the $10.00 multiplied by 
[c]redited [s]ervice and the additional $100.00 benefit do not 
continue beyond normal retirement age, they cannot properly be 
considered a retirement-type subsidy as contemplated by section 
204(g),” and thus “could be the subject of amendment or 
elimination without violating section 204(g).”  Id. at 536 n.17.12 
 Turning to the early payment of unreduced normal retirement 
benefits, we concluded that the portion of the PJS benefits that 
continues beyond normal retirement age and “that is equal to the 
actuarially reduced normal retirement benefit, constitutes an 
early retirement benefit protected by section 204(g) but is not a 
retirement-type subsidy,” and that the value of the PJS benefits 
that continue beyond normal retirement age “over and above the 
actuarially reduced value” is a retirement-type subsidy protected 
by section 204(g).  Id. at 538.13
                                                 
12The district court in Bellas did not separately address this 
portion of the PJS benefits in its opinion nor do the parties here 
separately address these benefits in their briefs.  The distinction 
is of no consequence in the case at bar, however, as our holding 
applies to all facets of the PJS benefits.  
  We further determined that 
 
13In 2006, the Secretary of the Treasury enacted regulations 
defining these and other relevant terms for ERISA.  Those 
regulations define “early retirement benefit” and “retirement-
type subsidy” in the same manner as we did in Bellas.  See 26 
C.F.R. § 1.411(d)-3(g)(6)(i) (“The term early retirement benefit 
means the right, under the terms of the plan, to commence 
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those benefits “are accrued upon their creation rather than upon 
the occurrence of the unpredictable contingent event [i.e., the 
plan shutdown].”  Id. at 532.  We accordingly held that section 
204(g) protects the PJS benefits from cutback and therefore 
affirmed the district court’s conclusion that Westinghouse 
violated section 204(g) through enactment of the amendments.  
Id. at 540.  We also point out that, as we discuss at length below, 
in Bellas
 
 we invalidated the sunset provision as to 
Westinghouse. 
 
 
V.  ANALYSIS14
                                                                                                             
distribution of a retirement-type benefit at a particular date after 
severance from employment with the employer and before 
normal retirement age.”); 26 C.F.R. § 1.411(d)-3(g)(6)(iii) (“The 
term retirement-type benefit means (A) [t]he payment of a 
distribution alternative with respect to an accrued benefit; or (B) 
[t]he payment of any other benefit under a defined benefit plan . 
. . that is permitted to be in a qualified pension plan, continues 
after retirement, and is not an ancillary benefit.”); 26 C.F.R. § 
1.411(d)-3(g)(6)(iv) (“The term retirement-type subsidy means 
the excess, if any, of the actuarial present value of a retirement-
type benefit over the actuarial present value of the accrued 
benefit commencing at normal retirement age or at actual 
commencement date, if later, with both such actuarial present 
values determined as of the date the retirement-type benefit 
commences.”). 
 
 
14At the outset of our analysis, we note that the Court of Appeals 
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As we have already noted, the Magistrate Judge reached 
her conclusion that ERISA required Siemens to offer PJS 
benefits on the basis of two independent theories.  First, the 
Magistrate Judge determined that Siemens created an ERISA 
“transition” plan for the legacy employees through the extension 
of the Westinghouse Plan from August 19 to August 31, 1998.  
See Shaver, 2007 WL 1006681, at *21-23.  The Magistrate 
Judge concluded that adoption of the Siemens Plans functioned 
as an amendment of the ERISA “transition” plan and the 
amendment eliminated the legacy employees’ PJS benefits in 
violation of section 204(g).  See id.
 
, at *24-27.   
Second, the Magistrate Judge determined that 
Westinghouse transferred to Siemens through the APA a portion 
of Westinghouse Plan’s liabilities, thereby triggering the 
                                                                                                             
for the Eleventh Circuit in a not precedential opinion has 
weighed in on the Westinghouse-Siemens transaction in a 
factually-indistinguishable case and determined that the legacy 
employees are not entitled to PJS benefits.  See McCay v. 
Siemens Corp., 247 F. App’x 172 (11th Cir. 2007).  In 
accordance with our practice, however, we do not rely on that 
opinion as it is not precedential.  We nevertheless make 
reference to McCay because we think that it is important to note 
that Siemens does not contend that principles of claim or issue 
preclusion compel us to follow that case and thus we do not 
address that possibility.  In this regard, we point out that not 
precedential opinions no less than precedential opinions can 
have preclusive effect. 
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applicability of section 208.  See id., at *20.  The Magistrate 
Judge appeared to conclude that independently of section 
204(g), section 208 required that the Siemens Plans “provide 
equal or greater benefits” than those of the Westinghouse Plan.  
See id., at *27.  Turning to section 204(g), the Magistrate Judge 
concluded also that in light of our holding in Bellas that PJS 
benefits under the Westinghouse Plan are protected from 
cutback, section 204(g) also required that Siemens offer PJS 
benefits.  Id.
 
, at *27-28.   
We first consider whether Siemens established an ERISA 
“transition” plan, the less complex of the two theories.  We then 
proceed to the hyper-complicated question of the applicability of 
ERISA sections 208 and 204(g).   
 
A.  AN ERISA TRANSITION PLAN  
 
ERISA applies to “any employee benefit plan if it is 
established or maintained . . . by any employer engaged in 
commerce . . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 1003(a).  Surprisingly, however, 
ERISA does not define the term “plan.”  In the absence of a 
congressional definition, we have “adopted the test developed in 
Donovan v. Dillingham, 688 F.2d 1367 (11th Cir. 1982) (en 
banc), to determine whether informal written or oral 
communications . . . constitute a plan.”  Smith v. Hartford Ins. 
Grp., 6 F.3d 131, 136 (3d Cir. 1993) (citing Deibler v. United 
Food & Commercial Workers’ Local Union 23, 973 F.2d 206, 
209 (3d Cir. 1992); Henglein v. Informal Plan For Plant 
Shutdown Benefits, 974 F.2d 391, 399-400 (3d Cir. 1992)).  
Under Donovan, an ERISA plan “is established if from the 
surrounding circumstances a reasonable person can ascertain the 
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intended benefits, a class of beneficiaries, the source of 
financing, and procedures for receiving benefits.”  688 F.2d at 
1373.  Looking to these factors, the Magistrate Judge concluded 
that Siemens adopted an ERISA “transition” plan for the 
thirteen-day period from August 19 to August 31, 1998, by 
virtue of Westinghouse’s extension of its pension plan to cover 
the legacy employees during that time. 
 
Siemens challenges this conclusion on multiple grounds.  
It contends that ERISA plans are permanent or at least long-term 
programs and that the patently temporary nature of the thirteen-
day extension precludes it from being classified as an ERISA 
plan.  Appellants’ br. at 53-54.  Siemens also contends that even 
if a temporary extension of one ERISA plan could qualify as the 
establishment of a second and distinct ERISA plan, 
Westinghouse — not Siemens — was the plan sponsor and 
administrator during the thirteen-day period.  Id. at 54-55.  In 
this vein, Siemens points to the facts that Westinghouse was 
liable for any benefits that came due to a beneficiary under the 
plan during the thirteen-day period and Siemens’ only obligation 
with respect to that period was to reimburse Westinghouse for 
any actuarial pension losses caused by Siemens’ termination of a 
legacy employee without cause during that time.  Id.
 
 at 56. 
 For the thirteen-day period at issue, a reasonable person 
could have ascertained the benefits under the Westinghouse 
Plan, identified the beneficiaries, the source of financing, and 
procedures for receiving benefits.  We thus concur with the 
Magistrate Judge and, by extension with the District Court, that 
there was an ERISA plan in place from August 19 to August 31, 
1998, for the legacy employees.  The critical question, however, 
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is not whether there was a sponsor maintaining an ERISA plan 
during the thirteen-day period; it is whether Siemens 
“established or maintained” that plan, 29 U.S.C. § 1003(a), i.e., 
whether, in ERISA parlance, Siemens was the “plan sponsor,” 
see
 
 29 U.S.C. § 1002(16)(B).   
The District Court found that Siemens maintained the 
plan because it determined that Siemens had administrative and 
financial responsibilities with respect to the plan during the 
thirteen-day period.  But in reaching this conclusion, the Court 
relied solely on the fact that Siemens was obligated to reimburse 
Westinghouse for any actuarial pension loss that Siemens’ 
termination of a legacy employee caused during the period.  We, 
however, are satisfied that, contrary to the District Court’s 
conclusion, Siemens’ duty to reimburse Westinghouse for any 
losses that Siemens caused by termination of a legacy employee 
from August 19 to August 31, 1998, demonstrates quite clearly 
that Siemens was not responsible for the pension obligations that 
came due during this time period under the Westinghouse Plan.  
In fact, there is no factual dispute that at all times of the 
Westinghouse Plan’s existence, including the thirteen-day 
period, Westinghouse has been and is currently responsible for 
the maintenance, administration, and funding of its plan.  
Siemens’ singular promise of reimbursement to Westinghouse in 
the event that Siemens terminated a legacy employee describes 
the entirety of Siemens’ obligations in relation to the 
Westinghouse Plan from August 19 to August 31, 1998, and 
plainly does not constitute the administrative undertaking that an 
ERISA plan requires.  After all, an obligation to make payments 
to a plan sponsor cannot possibly be equated with the 
obligations attendant to establishing or maintaining a plan. 
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 On this issue, we take instruction from the Supreme 
Court’s seminal ERISA opinion in Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. 
Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 107 S.Ct. 2211 (1987), in which the Court 
considered an ERISA preemption claim.  Under ERISA, any 
state law that “relate[s] to any employee benefit plan described 
in [section] 1003(a)” is preempted.  29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).  In 
Fort Halifax
 
, the Court considered whether ERISA preempted a 
Maine statute requiring employers to provide a one-time 
severance payment to employees in the event of a plant closing.  
482 U.S. at 4-5, 107 S.Ct. at 2213-14.  The Court concluded that 
ERISA did not preempt the Maine statute because it was not an 
ERISA “plan,” and in this regard stated:  
 The requirement of a one-time, lump-sum 
payment triggered by a single event requires no 
administrative scheme whatsoever to meet the 
employer’s obligation.  The employer assumes no 
responsibility to pay benefits on a regular basis, 
and thus faces no periodic demands on its assets 
that create a need for financial coordination and 
control.  Rather, the employer’s obligation is 
predicated on the occurrence of a single 
contingency that may never materialize.  The 
employer may well never have to pay the 
severance benefits.  To the extent that the 
obligation to do so arises, satisfaction of that duty 
involves making a single set of payments to 
employees at the time the plant closes.  To do 
little more than write a check hardly constitutes 
the operation of a benefit plan.  Once this single 
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event is over, the employer has no further 
responsibility.  The theoretical possibility of a 
one-time obligation in the future simply creates 
no need for an ongoing administrative program 
for processing claims and paying benefits.  
 
Id. at 12, 107 S.Ct. at 2218 (emphasis in original).  Fort Halifax 
thus makes clear that the payment of benefits “do[es] not 
implicate ERISA unless [it] require[s] the establishment and 
maintenance of a separate and ongoing administrative scheme.” 
 Angst v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 969 F.2d 1530, 1538 (3d Cir. 
1992); see also Kulinski v. Medtronic Bio-Medicus Inc.
 
, 21 F.3d 
254, 257 (8th Cir. 1994) (“The pivotal inquiry is whether the 
plan requires the establishment of a separate, ongoing 
administrative scheme to administer the plan’s benefits.”).   
To contrast with the simplicity of the single payment that 
the statute that the Court considered in Fort Halifax
 
 required, the 
Court provided substantial guidance on what constitutes an 
ERISA “administrative scheme,” an obligation that goes far 
beyond making a single payment.  The Court elaborated: 
An employer that makes a commitment 
systematically to pay certain benefits undertakes a 
host of obligations, such as determining the 
eligibility of claimants, calculating benefit levels, 
making disbursements, monitoring the availability 
of funds for benefit payments, and keeping 
appropriate records in order to comply with 
applicable reporting requirements.  
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482 U.S. at 9, 107 S.Ct. at 2216.  Thus, an ERISA 
administrative scheme “may arise where the employer, to 
determine the employee’s eligibility for and level of benefits, 
must analyze each employee’s particular circumstances in light 
of the appropriate criteria.”  Kulinski, 21 F.3d at 257; Bogue v. 
Ampex Corp., 976 F.2d 1319, 1323 (9th Cir. 1992) (An ERISA 
“administrative scheme” is one in which “the circumstances of 
each employee’s termination [are] analyzed in light of [certain] 
criteria.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  
Factors relevant to determining whether an employer’s 
undertakings have created an ERISA plan also include whether 
the “undertaking requires managerial discretion, that is, whether 
the undertaking could not be fulfilled without ongoing, 
particularized, administrative, analysis of each case” and 
whether “a reasonable employee would perceive an ongoing 
commitment by the employer to provide some employee 
benefits.”  Kosakow v. New Rochelle Radiology Assocs., 274 
F.3d 706, 737 (2d Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted).  On the other hand, “[s]imple or mechanical 
determinations do not necessarily require the establishment of 
such an administrative scheme.”  Kulinski
 
, 21 F.3d at 257.   
The narrow scope of Siemens’ obligations with respect to 
the thirteen-day period when considered against the 
“administrative scheme” analysis of Fort Halifax makes it quite 
clear that Siemens did not establish or maintain the ERISA plan 
that was in place from August 19 to August 31, 1998.  
Westinghouse — not Siemens — determined a plan participant’s 
eligibility for benefits arising under the Westinghouse Plan from 
August 19 to August 31, 1998, and Westinghouse calculated the 
quantum of those benefits and disbursed the funds due to the 
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participants in that period.  Further, Westinghouse funded the 
plan during that time and engaged in the extensive financial 
monitoring and record-keeping that the plan required.   
 
 In contrast, during the thirteen-day period Siemens had 
only the contingent, discrete obligation to reimburse 
Westinghouse Plan in the event Siemens terminated a legacy 
employee without cause prior to September 1, 1998, and the 
terminated employees, if any, were merely a subset of the 
entirety of the legacy employees.  That contingent financial 
burden — which notably Siemens never incurred as it did not 
terminate any legacy employee prior to September 1 — was 
“predicated on the occurrence of a single contingency that may 
never [and in this case did not] materialize.”  See Fort Halifax, 
468 U.S. at 12, 107 S.Ct. at 2218.  Siemens’ contingent 
obligation to reimburse Westinghouse after the fact did not 
require Siemens to make any administrative determination, see 
id., much less require it to analyze the legacy employees’ 
particular circumstances and eligibility for benefits.  While 
contingent or one-time pension or benefit obligations that 
require an administrative undertaking for their effectuation may, 
in some circumstances, constitute an ERISA plan, see Pane v. 
RCA Corp.
 
, 868 F.2d 631, 633-35 (3d Cir. 1989), in this case 
Siemens’ contingent, one-time obligation to reimburse 
Westinghouse did not.   
Although we are unaware of any earlier case in which we 
have considered an arrangement quite like the one here, in 
which after a successor employer employed legacy employees 
the original employer continued to offer for a brief period the 
legacy employees benefit credit for service and compensation, 
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we find additional guidance from our decision in Angst.  In that 
case, we considered whether a company’s offer of a one-time, 
lump-sum $75,000 severance payment and a one-year extension 
of benefits under its pension plan pursuant to a “buyout plan” 
aimed at encouraging senior employees to leave their 
employment voluntarily constituted an ERISA plan.  969 F.2d at 
1532-33.  We concluded that in light of Fort Halifax the $75,000 
payment was not an ERISA plan because the arrangement 
“would require no ongoing administrative scheme.”  Id. at 1538. 
 We further determined that because the one-year extension of 
benefits was administered pursuant to a benefits plan that was 
already in existence and the extension “did not require the 
creation of a new administrative scheme, and did not materially 
alter an existing administrative scheme,” that facet of the buyout 
plan similarly did not implicate ERISA.  Id. at 1539.  As in 
Angst
 
, here the extension of the already-extant Westinghouse 
Plan for thirteen days did not require Siemens to create a 
separate, new administrative scheme.  Nor did that extension 
alter the Westinghouse Plan’s existing administrative scheme; it 
merely added a contingent step subsequent to the operation of 
the plan.   
 Although we conclude that Siemens did not establish an 
ERISA “transition” plan by virtue of the thirteen-day 
arrangement from August 19 to August 31, 1998, because that 
arrangement did not require Siemens to perform the 
administrative undertaking that is the hallmark of an ERISA 
plan, we note that the short duration of the arrangement likewise 
counsels against finding that, if there had been any plan, it was 
Siemens that established the plan.  We have made clear that 
“[t]he crucial factor in determining whether a ‘plan’ has been 
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established is whether [the employer has expressed an intention] 
to provide benefits on a regular and long-term basis.’”  Deibler, 
973 F.2d at 209 (quoting Wickman v. Northwestern Nat’l Ins. 
Co.
 
, 908 F.2d 1077, 1083 (1st Cir. 1990)).  Consistent with this 
pronouncement, the relevant Treasury regulations provide:  
The term ‘plan’ implies a permanent as 
distinguished from a temporary program.
 
  Thus . . 
. the abandonment of the plan for any reason other 
than business necessity within a few years after it 
has taken effect will be evidence that the plan 
from its inception was not a bona fide program for 
the exclusive benefit of employees in general.   
26 C.F.R. § 1.401-1(b)(2) (emphasis added); see also 26 C.F.R. 
§ 1.401-1(b)(1)(i) (“A pension plan within the meaning of 
section 401(a) is a plan established and maintained by an 
employer primarily to provide systematically for the payment of 
definitely determinable benefits to his employees over a period 
of years, usually for life, after retirement
 
.”).  Although we 
cannot draw a bright temporal line dividing ERISA plans from 
short-term, discrete benefit arrangements that do not implicate 
ERISA, we are confident that the thirteen-day arrangement here 
is of the latter type.   
 We note finally on the “transition” plan issue that 
Siemens’ status as the legacy employees’ actual employer during 
the thirteen-day window does not preclude us from concluding 
that Westinghouse maintained an ERISA plan for those persons 
during that time.  ERISA defines an employee pension benefit 
plan as one “established or maintained by an employer or by an 
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employee organization, or by both.”  29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A).  
Under ERISA, however, “[t]he term ‘employer’ means any 
person acting directly as an employer, or indirectly in the 
interest of an employer, in relation to an employee benefit plan.” 
 29 U.S.C. § 1002(5) (emphasis added).  ERISA thus recognizes 
that entities other than the participant’s employer may establish 
or maintain an ERISA plan.  See also Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. 
Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. 73, 78, 115 S.Ct. 1223, 1228 (1995) 
(“Employers or other plan sponsors
 
 are generally free under 
ERISA, for any reason at any time, to adopt, modify, or 
terminate welfare plans.”) (emphasis added).  Here, 
Westinghouse acted “indirectly in the interest of an employer 
[i.e., Siemens], in relation to an employee benefit plan” for the 
thirteen-day period.  29 U.S.C. § 1002(5).  The circumstance 
that the beneficiaries of the Westinghouse Plan during that time 
period included persons whom Siemens then employed does not 
thereby make Siemens a co-sponsor of the plan when in reality 
Siemens neither funded nor administered the plan.   
In short, although there was an ERISA plan in place for 
legacy employees from August 19 to August 31, 1998, that plan 
was the Westinghouse Plan, which Westinghouse sponsored, 
funded, operated and administered.  We thus conclude that 
Siemens did not establish an ERISA “transition” plan.  
Consequently, Siemens did not provide PJS benefits to its 
employees during that time, and its later adoption of the 
Siemens Plans, which lacked PJS benefits, could not constitute 
an “amendment” of a “transition” plan in violation of section 
204(g), as Siemens had not established any plan to amend.  
Therefore, we reject the Magistrate Judge’s first theory 
supporting Siemens’ liability because she founded that theory on 
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the incorrect conclusion that Siemens created an  ERISA 
“transition” plan containing PJS benefits for the period from 
August 19 to August 31, 1998.   
 
B.  A TRANSFER OF LIABILITIES UNDER SECTION 208  
 
We now turn to the Magistrate Judge’s second theory 
supporting her belief that Siemens would be liable in the 
absence of the releases.  She predicated this conclusion on her 
belief that Westinghouse through the APA transferred a portion 
of the Westinghouse Plan’s liabilities to the Siemens Plans and 
thus we now turn our attention to section 208.  In considering 
this second theory we first address the applicability of section 
208, which applies where a plan “merge[s] or consolidate[s] 
with, or transfer[s] its assets or liabilities to” another plan.  29 
U.S.C. § 1058.  Though appellees concede that the APA did not 
provide for a plan consolidation, merger, or a transfer of plan 
assets, they contend that section 208 applies because the APA 
provided for the Westinghouse Plan to transfer liabilities to the 
Siemens Plans.  The District Court accepted this argument.   
 
            Section 208 does not set forth explicitly the 
circumstances in which there is a transfer of liabilities, nor do 
ERISA’s other provisions provide a definition of the term.  We 
are not, however, without guidance on this point as the 
corresponding Treasury Regulation states: 
 
A ‘transfer of assets or liabilities’ occurs when 
there is a diminution of assets or liabilities with 
respect to one plan and the acquisition of these 
assets or the assumption of these liabilities by 
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another plan.  For example, the shifting of assets 
or liabilities pursuant to a reciprocity agreement 
between two plans in which one plan assumes 
liabilities of another plan is a transfer of assets or 
liabilities.  
 
26 C.F.R. § 1.414(l)-1(b)(3).  To determine whether there has 
been a transfer of plan liabilities within this definition in this 
case, we turn to the APA.   
 
1.  RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE APA 
 
At its broadest, the APA provided in paragraph 5.5(a)(ii) 
that  
 
Notwithstanding the more specific 
provisions set forth in this Section 5.5, [Siemens] 
shall provide compensation and benefit plans and 
arrangements which in the aggregate are 
comparable
 
 . . . to the compensation, Plans and 
Benefit Arrangements in effect for [the legacy 
employees] on [September 1, 1998] for a period 
of not less than two years following [September 1, 
1998].  
J.A. 137 (emphasis added).15
                                                 
15Siemens points out that in a certification required by the APA 
it was stated that Siemens’ benefits were “in the aggregate 
comparable” to those provided by Westinghouse.  Appellants’ 
br. at 11.  That fact, however, is not material to our disposition 
  Paragraph 5.5(d)(i) 
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provided in more precise terms that Siemens  
 
shall establish a defined benefit pension plan 
intended to qualify under Section 401(a) of the 
Code for the benefit of [the legacy employees] 
(the ‘Purchaser Pension Plan’) that contains terms 
and conditions that are substantially identical with 
respect to all substantive provisions to those of 
the Westinghouse Pension Plan as in effect as of 
[September 1, 1998]
 
 . . . and that credits 
compensation . . . and service for purposes of 
eligibility (including early retirement eligibility 
and any early retirement supplemental benefit), 
and vesting which was credited under the 
[Westinghouse] Pension Plan, provided, however, 
that the [Siemens] Pension Plan will include 
provisions which are consistent with (ii) through 
(iv) below and will be administered . . . so that the 
aggregate of the benefits under the 
[Westinghouse] Pension Plan and the [Siemens] 
Pension Plan are the same with respect to [the 
legacy employees] as if the . . . [e]mployees 
continued employment with [Westinghouse or one 
of its sold subsidiaries]. 
Id. at 138 (emphasis omitted and added).16
                                                                                                             
of this case.   
   
 
16Notably, there is some discord between the requirement in 
paragraph 5.5(a)(ii) that Siemens provide benefits “which in the 
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The Magistrate Judge found that “the contractual 
obligation to provide substantially identical benefits to the 
transferring employees can be construed to be a transfer of 
[p]lan liability.”  Shaver
 
, 2007 WL 1006682, at *19.  While 
paragraph 5.5(d)(i) may suggest that the parties intended to 
impose liabilities on Siemens, Siemens’ contractual promise to 
provide substantially identical benefits surely does not constitute 
an assumption of Westinghouse Plan’s liabilities, as an 
agreement to provide benefits is discrete from an agreement to 
assume another employer’s obligation to provide benefits.  
Indeed, as we have noted already, after September 1, 1998, the 
Westinghouse Plan remained in existence and continued to 
provide legacy employees with benefits that they accrued prior 
to that date.  We therefore consider the more specific provisions 
of the APA, which require close examination. 
                                                                                                             
aggregate are comparable” to the benefits of the Westinghouse 
Plan and the requirement in paragraph 5.5(d)(i) that Siemens 
provide “substantially identical benefits” to the legacy 
employees as it would seem to be obvious that benefits could be 
“comparable” without being “substantially identical.”  While not 
a critical matter in light of the more detailed provisions of the 
APA, we believe that to the extent that the requirements are 
inconsistent the former takes precedence over the latter because 
paragraph 5.5(a)(ii) states that Siemens shall provide 
“comparable” benefits “[n]otwithstanding the more specific 
provisions set forth in . . . Section 5.5.”  See Black’s Law 
Dictionary 1168 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “notwithstanding” as 
“[d]espite; in spite of”).   
 
 41 
Section 2.3 of the APA provides, in relevant part:  
 
(a) Assumed Liabilities. Upon the terms 
and subject to the conditions of this Agreement . . 
. , [Siemens] hereby agrees to assume, effective as 
of [September 1, 1998], and agrees to pay, 
perform and discharge when due all of the 
following Liabilities of [Westinghouse] (except 
Excluded Liabilities) arising out of, relating to or 
otherwise in respect of the Acquired Assets, the 
Business or the operations of the Business before, 
on or after [September 1, 1998] (collectively, the 
‘Assumed Liabilities’
. . .  
): 
(vii)  all liabilities arising under or 
in connection with any Plan or Benefit 
Arrangement
  . . .  
;  
(b)  Excluded Liabilities. Any provision of 
this Agreement to the contrary notwithstanding . . 
. , the following liabilities (the ‘Excluded 
Liabilities’
. . .  
) of [Westinghouse] and [its] Sold 
Subsidiaries are excluded and shall not be 
assumed or discharged by [Siemens]: 
(x)  any Liabilities with respect to 
Plans and Benefit Arrangements retained 
by [Westinghouse] under Section 5.5; and  
(xi)  any other Liabilities not 
assumed by [Siemens] pursuant to the 
provisions of Section 2.3(a).  
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J.A. 133-35 (some emphasis added).   
 
Under paragraph 2.3(a)(viii), Siemens assumed “[a]ll 
[l]iabilities arising under or in connection with any Plan or 
Benefit Arrangement.”  The APA defines “Plan” as: 
 
any plan, program, agreement or arrangement, 
whether or not written, that is or was an 
‘employee benefit plan’ as such term is defined in 
Section 3(3) of ERISA, whether or not subject to 
ERISA and whether or not maintained in the U.S., 
and (a) which is maintained by [Westinghouse] or 
[its] Sold Subsidiaries, (b) to which 
[Westinghouse] or [its] Sold Subsidiaries 
contribute or fund or provide benefits; or (c) 
which provides or promises benefits to any person 
who performs or who has performed services for 
[Westinghouse] or [its] Sold Subsidiaries and 
because of those services is or has been (i) a 
participant therein or (ii) entitled to benefits 
thereunder. 
 
Id.
 
 127.  The Westinghouse Plan is a “plan” within the meaning 
of paragraph 2.3(a)(viii).  Accordingly, Siemens assumed all of 
Westinghouse Plan’s liabilities except those which 
Westinghouse retained under section 5.5.   
In relevant part, section 5.5 provided that the 
“[Westinghouse] Pension Plan shall retain liability with respect 
to [the legacy employees] for their accrued benefit calculated as 
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of [September 1, 1998], subject to [certain adjustments].”  Id.
 
 
138-39.  Paragraph 5.5(d)(iv), however, qualifies 
Westinghouse’s retention of accrued-benefit liability by stating: 
[Siemens] Pension Plan shall be solely 
responsible for (and the [Westinghouse] Pension 
Plan shall not provide for) (A) any early 
retirement supplement that becomes payable with 
respect to a [legacy employee] retiring after 
[September 1, 1998] that is the result of a 
‘Pension Event’ as defined in subsection (v)[17
                                                 
17Paragraph 5.5(d)(v) in turn defined a “Pension Event” as 
encompassing “(A) a Disposition, (B) a closing of a plant or 
plants by [Siemens] or a reduction in the number of [legacy 
employees] employed by [Siemens] and its Affiliates as a result 
of action requiring the filing of a notice under the Worker 
Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act . . . , or (C) any 
action of [Siemens] or its Affiliates that provides an incentive to 
[legacy employees] to terminate or retire prior to their Normal 
Retirement Date.”  J.A. 140.  Relatedly, paragraph 5.5(d)(v) 
stated that Siemens “shall indemnify [Westinghouse] for any 
actuarial losses . . . with respect to the [Westinghouse] Pension 
Plan resulting from [any early retirements triggered by the 
enumerated Pension Events].”  Id.  
] . . 
. , (B) any benefits pursuant to Section 19 [the 
PJS provision] of the [Westinghouse] Pension 
Plan and the corresponding provision of the 
[Siemens] Pension Plan, in excess of the benefits 
that would otherwise be payable if those sections 
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did not apply, with respect to a [legacy employee] 
who retires or terminates employment with 
[Siemens] and its Affiliates after [September 1, 
1998], and (C) any other early retirement subsidy 
or supplement with respect to [legacy employees] 
that is not described in [Section 5 of the 
Westinghouse Pension Plan].  
 
Id.
 
 139-40.  The additional provisions of section 5.5 added by 
amendment to the APA delineate further Siemens’ and 
Westinghouse’s respective scopes of liability from August 19 to 
August 31, 1998; however, they do not alter the pre-existing 
provisions of section 5.5 recited above.  
Taken together, paragraphs 2.3(a)(viii), 5.5(d)(iii), and 
5.5(d)(iv) demonstrate that Siemens assumed a portion of 
Westinghouse Plan’s pension obligations.  Specifically, after 
adoption of the APA, Siemens was and is liable for the early 
retirement supplements that come due because of a “Pension 
Event,” for any PJS benefits payable under the Westinghouse 
Plan with respect to a legacy employee who retires after 
September 1, 1998,18
                                                 
18Of course, the liability for PJS benefits was dependent on such 
benefits being due, and as we explain later the APA did not 
impose liability for PJS benefits for job separations after August 
31, 1998.  Plainly, in the complex APA Westinghouse was 
covering itself on this point as paragraph 5.5(d)(iv) made 
Siemens liable only for “any” PJS benefits after September 1, 
1998, language that readily accommodates a situation in which 
there are no such benefits.  Moreover, the sunset provision that 
 and any other early retirement subsidy or 
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supplement besides that provided for in section 5 of the 
Westinghouse Plan.19
 
  In this regard, the Westinghouse Plan’s 
liabilities have been diminished, thus triggering the applicability 
of section 208.  
 Siemens presents an array of arguments that it contends 
precludes a finding that the APA provided for the Westinghouse 
Plan to transfer liabilities to the Siemens Plans in accordance 
with section 208.  It contends that because paragraph 5.5(d)(iv) 
“addressed only a tiny subset of retirement benefits offered by 
Westinghouse — those providing special early retirement for 
certain employees who retired prior to age 62 — that are not 
claimed by [appellees] here and are not at issue in this case,” any 
liabilities transferred for those benefits are irrelevant.  
Appellants’ br. at 47.  In a somewhat contradictory argument, 
Siemens contends that even if Westinghouse transferred some 
obligations to Siemens, “the contingent and inchoate 
responsibility for PJS benefits and early retirement supplements 
. . . [are] not ‘liabilities’ within the meaning of [s]ection 208.”  
                                                                                                             
was in existence when the APA was executed, though as we will 
explain we later invalidated, made it clear that there could not be 
PJS benefits for job terminations after September 1, 1998. 
 
19One example of such an early retirement supplement for which 
Westinghouse is apparently no longer responsible lies in section 
20 of the Westinghouse Plan, which provides for a “Special 
Early Retirement Supplement,” based on age and years of 
service, to be paid as a monthly pension until the employee 
reaches sixty-two years of age.  J.A. 351.   
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Id. at 50.  Finally, Siemens contends that the APA could not 
have provided for a transfer to Siemens of a portion of 
Westinghouse Plan’s liabilities because a transfer of liabilities 
without a transfer of equivalent assets “would leave both plans 
out of compliance with statutory and regulatory requirements.”20 
 Id.
 
 at 41.  These contentions are unconvincing.   
Though the events here differ from the ordinary scenario 
that triggers the applicability of section 208, we can find nothing 
within section 208 or the applicable Treasury regulations 
indicating that only a transfer of all of a plan’s assets or 
liabilities will activate that provision.  Indeed, 26 C.F.R. § 
1.414(l)-1(b)(3) defines a transfer of liabilities as “a diminution 
of . . . liabilities,” not a total elimination of liabilities.  See 
Black’s Law Dictionary 524 (9th ed. 2009) (Diminution means 
“[t]he act or process of decreasing, lessening, or taking away.”). 
 Furthermore, as shown above, Siemens assumed liability for 
any PJS benefits that became payable under the Westinghouse 
Plan for an employee who was terminated after September 1, 
1998.21
                                                 
20This argument is remarkable because it seems to be predicated 
on the principle that parties could not do anything illegal 
because to do so would be illegal.  Oh that this would be so.  On 
the other hand, though unlikely, it might mean that in a case of 
ambiguity the scope of a party’s undertakings should be 
measured in such a way that they are lawful. 
   
  
21As we explain below, Siemens’ assumption of this liability 
was effectively hollow, as an employee who Siemens terminated 
would not be eligible for PJS benefits under the Westinghouse 
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Siemens’ contention that responsibility for PJS benefits 
and other early retirement benefits do not constitute liabilities 
within the meaning of section 208 is likewise unavailing.  As we 
have indicated, section 208 does not define liabilities.  In the 
Senate Report to the 1984 amendments, however, Congress 
made clear its view that contingent or otherwise putative 
obligations constitute “liabilities” on a plan termination basis 
under ERISA.  See S. Rep. No. 98-575, at 31, 1984 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2577 (“[A] plan is not to be considered to have 
satisfied all of its liabilities to participants and beneficiaries until 
it has provided for the payment of contingent liabilities with 
respect to a participant who, after the date of the termination of 
a plan, meets the requirements for a subsidized benefit.”) 
(emphasis added); see also Gillis
 
, 4 F.3d at 1147 (treating 
liability for early retirement benefits as “liabilities” under 
section 208). 
Finally on this point, we note that section 208 applies 
when a pension plan “transfer[s] its assets or
 
 liabilities” to 
another plan, 29 U.S.C. § 1058 (emphasis added), and thus 
plainly does not require a transfer of assets to trigger its 
provisions.  The question of whether Westinghouse’s transfer of 
liabilities without a concomitant transfer of assets rendered the 
Westinghouse Plan and Siemens Plans non-compliant under 
ERISA is not the issue before us on appeal. 
Inasmuch as we have concluded that Westinghouse 
                                                                                                             
Plan.  Nevertheless, Siemens could seek to cover itself on this 
point.  
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transferred liabilities to the Siemens Plans within the meaning of 
section 208, we turn to the distinct question of what effect, if 
any, that transfer had on Siemens’ obligation, vel non, to 
provide PJS benefits.  As noted, the Magistrate Judge appeared 
to conclude that, without regard for section 204(g), because 
Westinghouse transferred liabilities to Siemens, section 208 
required that the Siemens Plans “provide equal or greater 
benefits,” including PJS benefits, to the benefits of the 
Westinghouse Plan.  See Shaver
 
, 2007 WL 1006681, at *27.  
The Magistrate Judge also determined that section 208 triggered 
section 204(g), which required Siemens to offer PJS benefits.  
We review each of these conclusions in turn. 
2.  THE REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION 208  
 
As we described above, section 208 guarantees that if a 
pension plan consolidates with another plan or transfers its 
assets or liabilities to another plan, the benefits to which plan 
participants are entitled will not be reduced and the actual value 
of those benefits will not be diminished.  See Bigger v. Am. 
Commercial Lines
 
, 862 F.2d 1341, 1344 (8th Cir. 1988) 
(Section 208 “establishes a ‘rule of benefit equivalence.’  The 
value of the benefit before and after the [transaction triggering 
section 208] must be equal.”) (citing 26 C.F.R. § 1.414(l)-1(n)). 
 In the House Report to section 208, Congress explained the 
effect of section 208 and the hypothetical termination analysis it 
requires:  
Under the bill as passed by the House, a plan must 
provide protection to participants in the case of a 
merger of the plan with another plan or the 
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transfer of assets or liabilities from a plan.  The 
value of benefits to the participant and the extent 
to which the benefits have been funded is to be 
protected by comparing what the participant's 
benefit would be if the plan had terminated 
immediately before the merger and what the 
participant's benefits would be under the merged 
plan had the merged plan been terminated just 
after the merger. The postmerger termination 
benefit may not be less than the premerger 
termination benefit. 
 
 H.R. Rep. No. 93-1280, at 385 (1974) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in
 
 
1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5038, 5163.   
Most often, section 208 is implicated in cases of plan 
mergers or so-called “spinoff” plans, in which one plan splits 
into two or more plans, see 26 C.F.R. § 1.414(l)-1(b)(4).  See, 
e.g., Bigger, 862 F.2d at 1344 (Section 208 “provides a specific 
standard that employers can rely upon in allocating assets to 
spunoff plans.”).  In these circumstances, “[s]ection 208 
essentially requires the employer to contemplate a hypothetical 
plan termination, take a ‘snapshot’ of the benefits each 
participant of the plan would receive in the event of a 
termination, and then provide the aggregate present value of 
these benefits to the spun-off plan.”  Systems Council EM-3 v. 
AT&T Corp.
 
, 159 F.3d 1376, 1380 (D.C. Cir. 1998).   
There is, however, no basis to hold that the APA 
contemplated the creation of a spinoff plan.  The Westinghouse 
Plan retained liability for the majority of the legacy employees’ 
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accrued benefits, and Siemens is not responsible for those 
benefits.  The Treasury regulation counterpart to section 208 
provides, however, that “[a]ny transfer of assets or liabilities 
will for purposes of section 414(l) be considered as a 
combination of separate mergers and spinoffs . . . .”  26 C.F.R. § 
1.414(l)-1(o).  “First, the transfer is treated as a spin-off of a 
new plan . . . [and] [a]ssets are therefore to be allocated to 
participants’ benefits on a termination basis.”  Stephen R. Bruce, 
Pension Claims: Rights and Obligations 511 (2d ed. 1993).  
“Second, the transfer of these assets and the associated benefit 
liabilities to the second plan is treated as a merger of the spun-
off plan and the second plan.”  Id.  Thus, as in the case of a plan 
spinoff or merger, to ascertain whether and to what extent 
Siemens was obligated to provide appellees PJS benefits we 
necessarily must determine the extent to which the legacy 
employees would have been entitled to those benefits upon a 
hypothetical termination of the Westinghouse Plan prior to 
Westinghouse’s transfer of its liability for those benefits.  Cf. 
Brillinger v. Gen. Elec. Co., 130 F.3d 61, 63 (2d Cir. 1997) 
(“[S]ection [208] deals with the level of post-merger benefits, 
and in dealing with this issue resort must be had to those parts of 
the termination provisions which deal with the analogous 
subject — i.e.
 
 the level of benefits following termination.”).  As 
we explained previously, that determination necessarily entails 
reference to section 204(g), which protects accrued benefits, 
including early retirement benefits and retirement-type 
subsidies, in the event of a plan amendment or a plan 
termination.   
This is all to say that section 208 is more nuanced than 
the Magistrate Judge recognized.  The section does not, as the 
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Magistrate Judge determined, impose a blanket requirement that 
Siemens adopt verbatim the Westinghouse Plan (or a more 
generous pension plan).  Rather, it protects appellees’ accrued 
benefits with those benefits determined as of a hypothetical 
termination of the Westinghouse Plan just prior to the transfer of 
liabilities.22
 
  Whatever else may be said about this case, the 
determination of those benefits so far as the Westinghouse Plan 
by its terms provided for them is not complicated. 
3.  THE LEGACY EMPLOYEES’ ENTITLEMENT ON 
                                                 
22 Reference to the corresponding Treasury regulation governing 
section 208 transactions bears the point out.  That regulation 
provides that in the case of a plan spinoff,  
 
the requirements of section 414(l) will be satisfied 
if (i) [a]ll of the accrued benefits of each 
participant are allocated to only one of the spun 
off plans, and (ii) [t]he value of the assets 
allocated to each of the spun off plans is not less 
than the sum of the present value of the benefits 
on a termination basis in the plan before the 
spinoff for all participants in that spun off plan. 
 
26 C.F.R. § 1.414(l)-1(n)(1).  In the case of a merger of two 
ERISA plans, “[i]f the sum of the assets of all plans is not less 
than the sum of the present values of the accrued benefit 
(whether or not vested) of all plans, the requirements of section 
414(l) will be satisfied by merely combining the assets and 
preserving each participant’s accrued benefits.”  26 C.F.R. § 
1.414(l)-1(e)(1). 
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A TERMINATION BASIS  
 
At this stage of our opinion and before we turn to the 
required hypothetical termination analysis we have described 
above, we address our description of PJS benefits in Bellas for it 
is obvious that our characterization of the benefits in that case 
clouded the disposition of this case in the District Court.  For the 
purposes of section 204(g), early retirement benefits and 
retirement-type subsidies are considered accrued benefits and 
therefore section 204(g) protects them from cutback.  See 29 
U.S.C. § 1054(g).  Section 204(g)(2) states, however, that “[i]n 
the case of a retirement-type subsidy, [section 204(g)(1)’s 
protection] shall apply only with respect to a participant who 
satisfies (either before or after the amendment) the 
preamendment conditions for the subsidy.”  29 U.S.C. § 
1054(g)(2).  Section 204(g) does not provide that same explicit 
qualifier on the protection of early retirement benefits.  As 
noted, in Bellas we conceptually bifurcated the PJS benefits, 
holding that the portion of the Westinghouse PJS benefits that is 
“equal to the actuarially reduced normal retirement benefit” is 
an early retirement benefit, while any benefits paid in excess of 
the actuarially reduced value constitutes a retirement-type 
subsidy.  221 F.3d at 538.  We further concluded that PJS 
benefits are accrued upon their creation — not upon the 
happening of the contingent event (i.e., the job separation) — 
and that section 204(g) accordingly protects those benefits from 
cutback.  Id. at 532.   Relying on Bellas’s division of PJS 
benefits into an early retirement subsidy and a retirement-type 
subsidy and section 204(g)(2)’s provision regarding satisfaction 
of preamendment conditions as to retirement-type subsidies, the 
Magistrate Judge determined that appellees were required to 
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establish that they would have been eligible for the PJS benefits 
under the terms of the Westinghouse Plan upon a hypothetical 
termination of that plan as to the portion of those benefits 
constituting a retirement-type subsidy but they were not required 
to do so as to that portion constituting an early retirement 
benefit.  See Shaver
 
, 2007 WL 100681, at *20.  But the 
Magistrate Judge predicated her approach on a misreading of 
section 204(g).     
We recognize that, regrettably, section 204(g)(2) is 
ambiguous, and in isolation its explicit statement that section 
204(g) protects retirement-type subsidies from cutback for a 
participant who satisfies, preamendment or postamendment, the 
preamendment conditions placed upon the subsidy could be read 
to mean that that qualifier does not apply to early retirement 
benefits, particularly in view of the circumstance that section 
204(g)(2)(A) addresses both “an early retirement benefit or a 
retirement-type subsidy.”   Thus, it might be thought that section 
204(g) protects from cutback a participant’s early retirement 
benefit even if the participant does not at the time of plan 
amendment (or in this case plan termination) and cannot in the 
future satisfy the conditions for that benefit.  We have made 
clear, however, that “the [Retirement Equity Act of 1984] does 
not override the conditions originally imposed by the [p]lan 
which defined the early retirement benefits when they were 
created.”  Dade, 68 F.3d at 1562.  Describing the import of 
section 204(g), we explained that “the fact that [amendments 
eliminating or reducing early retirement benefits or retirement-
type subsidies] will now be ‘treated as reducing accrued 
benefits’ does not mean that Congress intends to foreclose 
employers from circumscribing the availability of such optional 
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benefits when they are being created.”  Ashenbaugh v. Crucible 
Inc.,
 
 854 F.2d 1516, 1527 (3d Cir. 1988).   
As is evident from our foregoing explanation, especially 
our case law, “ERISA [section] 204(g) can protect an 
entitlement to benefits, but it cannot create an entitlement to 
benefits when no entitlement exists under the terms of the 
[p]lan.”  Hein v. FDIC, 88 F.3d 210, 217 (3d Cir. 1996) 
(emphasis added).  Indeed, notwithstanding our conceptual 
division of PJS benefits in Bellas
 
, in that case we assumed that 
section 204(g) protects early retirement benefits, along with 
retirement-type subsidies, only to the extent a plan participant 
satisfied or could satisfy the preamendment conditions placed 
upon the early retirement benefit.  We stated:  
After 1984, a plan sponsor could eliminate 
prospectively an early retirement benefit by 
amendment, but under section 204(g) the 
amendment could not adversely affect that portion 
of an early retirement benefit that already had 
accrued to a plan participant who satisfied the 
pre-amendment conditions for the benefit either 
before or after the amendment.  See 29 U.S.C. § 
1054(g); Dade, 68 F.3d at 1562.  Thus, if the 1994 
Westinghouse Plan amendments reduced or 
eliminated early retirement benefits or retirement-
type subsidies, the amendments would have had 
to allow employees who remained employed by 
CBS after the amendments to ‘grow into’ the 
benefit.  See id.
 
 at 1562.   
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221 F.3d at 524 (emphasis added); see also Bruce, Pension 
Claims 185 (“When an early retirement benefit, a retirement-
type subsidy, or a benefit option is protected against reduction or 
elimination, the protection is for the benefits that would be 
provided under the benefit option based on the accrued benefits 
up to the date of change, assuming that the participant has met 
or later meets any special eligibility (or vesting) requirement for 
the benefit
 
.”) (emphasis partially omitted and partially added).   
The legislative history to section 204(g) is consistent with 
our precedent and reveals Congress’ intent that section 204(g) 
protect only those benefits — whether classified as early 
retirement benefits or retirement-type subsidies — for which a 
participant meets the plan requirements.  The Senate Report 
states, in relevant part:  
 
The bill generally protects the accrual of 
benefits with respect to participants who have met 
the requirements for a benefit as of the time a plan 
is amended and participants who subsequently 
meet the preamendment  requirements
. . .  
.  The bill 
does not, however, prevent the reduction of a 
subsidy in the case of a participant who, at the 
time of separation from service (whether before or 
after the plan amendment), has not met the 
preamendment requirements.   
Accordingly, the bill makes it clear that the 
prohibition against reduction of a benefit subsidy 
(the excess of the value of a benefit over the 
actuarial equivalent of the normal retirement 
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benefit) applies to a participant only if the 
participant meets the conditions imposed by the 
plan on the availability of the subsidy.  If the 
protection is afforded, an employee’s accrued 
benefit is not to be less than the protected level or 
the accrued benefit determined under the plan 
without regard to the protection, whichever is 
greater.  For example, if a plan is amended to 
eliminate a subsidized early retirement benefit for 
employees who have completed 30 years of 
service, then the plan would not be required to 
provide the subsidy to an employee who never 
completes 30 years of service and it would not be 
required to provide benefits to such an employee 
before the normal retirement age.
 
   
S. Rep. No. 98-575, at 28, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2574 
(emphasis added).  The provision of benefits to an employee 
“before the normal retirement age” apart from the “subsidy” is, 
of course, an early retirement benefit as we defined that term in 
Bellas.  See
 
 221 F.3d at 538 (“[The] portion paid that is equal to 
the actuarially reduced normal retirement benefit[] constitutes an 
early retirement benefit.”).  It is thus apparent that despite 
section 204(g)’s focus on satisfaction of preamendment 
conditions for retirement-type subsidies, Congress assumed in 
passing section 204(g) that the provision only would protect 
early retirement benefits to the extent that an employee satisfied 
or can satisfy the plan conditions for the benefit.  
If there was any question as to the proper interpretation 
of section 204(g), the Treasury regulation implementing the 
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Internal Revenue Code counterpart to section 204(g), 26 U.S.C. 
§ 411, surely answers that question.  As noted, Treasury 
regulations implementing the Internal Revenue Code version of 
the anti-cutback rule apply with equal force to section 204(g).  
See
 
 29 U.S.C. § 1202(c).  The implementing regulation to 
section 411 provides:  
Except as provided in this section, a plan is 
treated as decreasing an accrued benefit if it is 
amended to eliminate or reduce a section 
411(d)(6)(B) benefit as defined in paragraph 
(g)(15) of this section.  This paragraph (b)(1) 
applies to participants who satisfy (either before 
or after the plan amendment) the preamendment 
conditions for a section 411(d)(6)(B) protected 
benefit
 
. 
26 C.F.R. § 1.411(d)-3(b)(1)(i) (emphasis added).  In turn, a 
section 411(d)(6)(B) protected benefit is defined as “the portion 
of an early retirement benefit
 
, retirement-type subsidy, or an 
optional form of benefit attributable to benefits accrued before 
the applicable amendment date.”  26 C.F.R. § 1.411(d)-3(g)(15) 
(emphasis added).  Accordingly, an early retirement benefit is 
considered accrued for purposes of section 411, and thus for 
purposes of section 204(g), only where the plan participant at 
some point satisfies the preamendment conditions for the 
benefit. 
In sum, we find that section 204(g) does not protect from 
cutback an early retirement benefit for a plan participant who 
has not satisfied and never can satisfy the conditions for 
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receiving the benefits that are subject to the cutback.  Indeed, 
were we to conclude otherwise our opinion would have the 
bizarre result that it would treat section 204(g) as protecting the 
benefits of a plan participant from cutback in circumstances in 
which the participant never will be eligible for those benefits.  
Thus, our opinion would extend section 204(g)’s protection on 
paper only to a set of phantom benefits which never actually will 
vest for the participant, or, result, directly contrary to our 
opinions in Ashenbaugh, Dade, and Hein, in going further in 
creating an entitlement under section 204(g) where none 
otherwise would exist under the terms of the plan.  The first 
result is unreasonable and the second is contrary to well-
established ERISA principles.  See Spink, 517 U.S. at 887, 116 
S.Ct. at 1788 (ERISA guarantees that “if a worker has been 
promised a defined pension benefit upon retirement — and if he 
has fulfilled whatever conditions are required to obtain a vested 
benefit — he will actually receive it.”) (emphasis added) 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Firestone Tire 
and Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 113, 109 S.Ct. 948, 956 
(1989) (ERISA was enacted “to protect contractually defined
 
 
benefits.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) 
(emphasis added).   
(a)  Appellees did not and could not satisfy 
the conditions for PJS benefits. 
 
Inasmuch as we have determined that we must analyze 
appellees’ entitlement to PJS benefits upon the basis of a 
hypothetical termination of the plans as to the entire portion of 
PJS benefits, we finally turn to the crux of this segment of our 
opinion and consider whether appellees would have been 
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entitled to PJS benefits upon a hypothetical termination of the 
Westinghouse Plan just prior to the transfer of liabilities.  In 
relevant part, the Westinghouse Plan provides that: 
 
For periods on or after January 1, 1997 and before 
September 1, 1998, a Permanent Job Separation 
means solely the termination of the employment 
of an Employee with an Employer, Affiliated 
Entity, or Excluded Unit because of job 
movement or product line relocation, or location 
closedown, as those terms are defined below. 
 
J.A. 292.  The Plan defines “Employer, Affiliated Entity, or 
Excluded Unit” as Westinghouse or any Westinghouse 
subsidiary or joint venture participating in the Westinghouse 
Plan.  Id. 284, 288, 292.  The Plan, however, contains the 
additional express limitation that “in no event shall a Permanent 
Job Separation occur if an Employee is offered continued 
employment by . . . a successor employer.”  Id.
 
 293.   
If the Westinghouse Plan had been terminated just prior 
to transferring a portion of its liabilities under the APA on 
September 1, 1998, appellees plainly would not have been 
eligible for PJS benefits.  As of that date, appellees were 
Westinghouse employees who were “offered continued 
employment by . . . a successor employer,” namely, Siemens.  
Nevertheless, as noted previously, under section 204(g) a plan 
participant need not satisfy at the time of a plan’s termination 
the conditions placed on an early retirement benefit or 
retirement-type subsidy.  If following the transfer of liabilities 
appellees potentially could have been eligible for the 
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Westinghouse Plan’s PJS benefits in the future, section 204(g) 
would have protected those benefits, and appellees’ benefits 
upon a hypothetical termination of the Westinghouse Plan prior 
to the transfer of liabilities thus would have included PJS 
benefits.  Accordingly, section 208 would have protected 
appellees’ PJS benefits from elimination or reduction by virtue 
of the Siemens-Westinghouse transaction.  Here, however, the 
bar to entitlement that would have existed in a pretransfer 
situation remains.  Appellees did not after the transfer of 
liabilities become eligible nor will they ever be eligible for PJS 
benefits under the Westinghouse Plan for the same reason they 
were not eligible for those benefits just prior to Westinghouse’s 
transfer of liabilities — they were offered continued 
employment by Siemens.  Accordingly, section 204(g) did not 
protect appellees’ PJS benefits from cutback and thus appellees’ 
benefits upon a hypothetical termination of the Westinghouse 
Plan just prior to the transfer of liabilities would not have 
included PJS benefits.   
 
Notwithstanding this seemingly insurmountable obstacle 
to appellees’ claim, the Magistrate Judge concluded that the 
successor-employer limitation on PJS benefits was not fatal to 
appellees’ claim, as she stated that “Gillis held that satisfaction 
of pre-amendment conditions does not have to occur until 
separation from service [and] as in Gillis, no separation from 
service occurred until Siemens terminated the transferred 
employees.”  Shaver, 2007 WL 1006681, at *28.  The 
Magistrate Judge did not, however, proceed to analyze whether 
appellees would have satisfied the conditions for PJS benefits 
upon Siemens’ termination of appellees.  Rather, she concluded 
that “the APA extends the PJS benefits by contractual 
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agreement,” such that the prohibitive language in the 
Westinghouse Plan did not bar appellees’ claim.  Id.
 
  These 
conclusions plainly were wrong. 
In Gillis, Hoechst Corporation sold a division of its 
business and transferred all assets and liabilities of its ERISA 
plan attributable to that division to American Mirrex.  4 F.3d at 
1140.  There was, in other words, a plan spinoff.  The American 
Mirrex Plan provided that employees of that division who 
transferred to American Mirrex were to “receive the same early 
retirement benefits subject to the same conditions as [the 
Hoechst Retirement Plan].”  Id. at 1149 (Alito, J., concurring).  
Plaintiffs were transferred employees who, at the time of 
transfer, had not met the age and years-of-service requirements 
to qualify for early retirement benefits under the Hoechst Plan.  
Id. at 1143.  Plaintiffs sued Hoechst and its pension plans, 
alleging that Hoechst’s failure to transfer sufficient assets to 
American Mirrex to fund plaintiffs’ early retirement benefits 
violated section 208.  Id.  They contended that notwithstanding 
their insufficient age and years-of-service at the time they 
transferred employment to American Mirrex they could qualify 
for the early retirement benefits provided under the Hoechst 
Plan through their subsequent service with American Mirrex, 
and that Hoechst’s contrary interpretation of its plan amounted 
to an amendment of the plan in violation of section 204(g).  Id. 
at 1144.  Hoechst countered that it was not required to credit 
service with American Mirrex and because plaintiffs could not 
satisfy the conditions for receiving those benefits section 204(g) 
did not protect them from cutback.  Id.
 
 at 1144. 
Finding scant guidance in the text of section 204(g), we 
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turned to pertinent Internal Revenue Service Rulings to resolve 
the case.  Id. at 1144-45.  Based on a Revenue Ruling that 
concluded that under section 204(g) an employee could satisfy 
following a plan termination the plan’s age and years-of-service 
pretermination conditions for early retirement benefits and that 
those benefits thus had to be funded before residual assets could 
revert to the employer, we determined that had Hoechst 
continued to employ the plaintiffs after terminating its plan the 
plaintiffs still would have been able to qualify for the early 
retirement benefits at some future date and Hoechst would have 
had to have allowed the employees to “grow into” those 
benefits.  Id. at 1145-46.  Relying on a further Revenue Ruling 
that determined that a “separation from service” does not occur 
upon an employee’s transfer to a successor employer, we 
concluded that because the plaintiffs continued in the same job 
for a successor employer, they could continue to accumulate 
years of service under the Hoechst Plan through their subsequent 
employment with American Mirrex and potentially satisfy the 
age and years-of-service requirements for the early retirement 
benefit.  Id. at 1144-47.  Accordingly, we held that section 208 
required that Hoechst transfer sufficient assets to American 
Mirrex to fund the early retirement benefits.  Id.
 
 at 1147.   
Gillis confirmed that satisfaction of benefit conditions 
can occur after a plan termination or amendment.  It is equally 
clear from that case, however, that a plan participant 
nevertheless must, at some point, meet all of the conditions 
placed upon those benefits to receive them.  Appellees contend 
that the Magistrate Judge correctly found their claims viable 
under Gillis notwithstanding the absence of any analysis of 
appellees’ eligibility because under Gillis “transferred 
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employees may treat service for a successor employer as service 
for the plan sponsor for the purpose of qualifying for early 
retirement benefits.”  Appellees’ br. at 9.  But this statement is 
not correct for Gillis
 
 does not stand for the broad proposition 
that service with a successor employer may be treated as service 
for the plan sponsor to the end that all conditions the plan 
sponsor places upon retirement benefits are obviated.   
We concluded in Gillis that employees who continue in 
the same job for a successor employer that has assumed the 
assets and liabilities of the original employer’s plan may work 
towards satisfying the age and years-of-service requirements of 
the original employer’s plan while working for the successor 
employer.  4 F.3d at 1147.  But in Gillis, there was no bar to the 
plaintiffs’ eligibility for the benefits under the Hoechst Plan 
other than their inadequate age and years of service at the time 
they ceased employment for Hoechst and plaintiffs could meet 
those requirements with the progression of time.  Here, 
however, we do not have a plan spinoff, and age and years-of-
service requirements are not the impediments to appellees’ PJS 
benefits eligibility under the Westinghouse Plan.  Rather, the 
“successor employer” provision of the Westinghouse Plan is an 
explicit bar to eligibility that, quite aside from the sunset 
provision in the Westinghouse Plan, forever disqualifies 
appellees from receiving PJS benefits under that plan and is a 
prohibition that the passage of time cannot cure.  
Notwithstanding the timing of appellees’ “separation from 
service,” appellees became ineligible for PJS benefits upon 
being offered continued employment by Siemens.  Stated 
another way, appellees could not fulfill the conditions required 
to obtain the PJS benefits as one of those conditions was that a 
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successor employer not offer a plan participant continued 
employment and that is precisely what happened here.  
Accordingly, we are at a total loss as to how, as appellees urge 
that we do, we can circumvent this explicit condition of the 
Westinghouse Plan by somehow treating appellees’ service with 
Siemens as uninterrupted service with Westinghouse and, 
directly contrary to the terms of the Westinghouse Plan, ignore 
appellees’ employment by Siemens.  We decline to engage in 
such judicial alchemy. 
 
Though our result does not depend on this point, we note 
also that upon termination by Siemens appellees faced the 
additional bar to PJS eligibility that “solely” a termination by 
Westinghouse, a Westinghouse subsidiary, or a joint venture 
participating in the Westinghouse Plan allowed for PJS benefits 
under the Westinghouse Plan.  J.A. 292.  Siemens is not a 
Westinghouse subsidiary nor is it a joint venture participating in 
the Westinghouse Plan.   
 
Once before, in Gritzer v. CBS, Inc., 275 F.3d 291, 293-
94 (3d Cir. 2002), we considered whether termination by a 
successor employer entitles former Westinghouse employees to 
PJS benefits under the Westinghouse Plan.  In that case, the 
plaintiffs were former Westinghouse employees who had 
transferred employment to Industrial Ceramics, Inc., 
(“Ceramics”) upon Westinghouse’s sale of a facility to 
Ceramics.  Id. at 293.  Section 14(f)(1) of the relevant 
Westinghouse Plan provided that the plan managers “may . . . 
and to the extent they consider advisable, treat service with [a 
successor company] as service with [Westinghouse] for 
purposes of [vesting and eligibility for pensions and benefits].”  
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Id. at 297.  Pursuant to the sale, Ceramics and Westinghouse 
also executed a Reciprocal Service Agreement (“RSA”) 
providing that Westinghouse would grant to transferred 
employees “service credit for their service with [Ceramics] for 
the purposes of pension eligibility under any applicable 
[Westinghouse] pension plan in which the employe[e]s may 
have been participating, but not for purposes of pension benefit 
accrual thereunder.”  Id. at 293.  Ceramics later closed the 
facility, and the plaintiffs sued Westinghouse, by then, CBS for 
PJS benefits.  Id.
 
 at 294.   
We observed that the Westinghouse Plan requires that the 
“Employer” terminate an employee for purposes of PJS 
eligibility and that “‘Employer’ means simply Westinghouse.”  
Id. at 297.  We concluded that, “any other successor company . . 
. does not qualify as an ‘Employer’ under the express terms of 
the Plan,” and that this fact was a “seemingly fatal flaw” in the 
plaintiffs’ argument because a termination by Ceramics was 
plainly not a qualifying termination under the PJS benefits 
provision.  Id.  We then rejected the plaintiffs’ contention that 
“Westinghouse, by extending some benefits under the Plan 
through its RSA with Ceramics, automatically or necessarily by 
virtue of [section] 14(F)(1) extended [PJS] benefits,” id. at 298, 
and we thus held that the plaintiffs could not qualify for PJS 
benefits, id.
 
 at 298-99.   
As was true with respect to a successor employer to 
Westinghouse in Gritzer, Siemens’ termination of appellees was 
not a termination that triggered a possible claim for the PJS 
benefits provision under the Westinghouse Plan.  This fact 
serves as an additional and independent bar to appellees’ 
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eligibility under the Westinghouse Plan apart from the successor 
employer provision.  It is important to recognize that appellees’ 
ineligibility for PJS benefits is not rooted in the sunset provision 
of the Westinghouse Plan that we struck down in Bellas
 
, and 
that congruently the invalidation of the sunset provision cannot 
possibly make the appellees eligible for PJS benefits from the 
Westinghouse Plan or thus eligible for benefits under the 
Siemens Plans.  Rather, with or without the sunset provision, 
there simply is no escape from the conclusion that appellees 
could not satisfy the requisite conditions for receiving PJS 
benefits under the Westinghouse Plan.  Moreover, appellees do 
not challenge the validity of these other requisite conditions.   
Accordingly, because appellees could not satisfy at the 
time of a hypothetical termination of the Westinghouse Plan nor 
could they have satisfied at a later date the conditions for 
receiving PJS benefits under the Westinghouse Plan, section 
204(g) did not protect those benefits upon a hypothetical 
termination of the Westinghouse Plan.  Thus, appellees’ benefits 
upon a hypothetical termination of the Westinghouse Plan just 
prior to the transfer of liabilities would not have included PJS 
benefits.  Furthermore, upon a hypothetical termination of the 
Siemens Plans just following the transfer of liabilities, 
appellees’ benefits also would not have included PJS benefits.  
Hence, appellees would have received no less upon a 
hypothetical termination of the Siemens’ Plans following the 
transfer of liabilities than they would have received upon a 
hypothetical termination of the Westinghouse Plan just prior to 
the transfer of liabilities.  Consequently, Siemens’ omission of a 
provision for PJS benefits and appellees’ consequent lack of 
entitlement to PJS benefits upon a hypothetical termination of 
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Siemens Plans just following the transfer of liabilities did not 
diminish appellees’ benefits and neither section 208 nor section 
204(g) required that Siemens provide appellees with PJS 
benefits.   
 
  (b)  The APA did not contractually require 
Siemens to offer PJS benefits. 
 
 But the Magistrate Judge had more arrows in her quiver 
than sections 208 and 204(g) because she found alternatively 
that appellees were not required to meet the terms of the 
Westinghouse Plan because “the APA extends the PJS benefits 
by contractual agreement.”  Shaver, 2007 WL 1006681, at *28.  
In theory, such an agreement could have supported her 
recommendation.  Appellees understandably rely heavily on this 
contractual theory as they contend that the APA provision 
requiring Siemens to adopt a pension plan for the legacy 
employees “that contains terms and conditions that are 
substantially identical with respect to all substantive provisions 
to those of the Westinghouse Pension Plan as in effect as of 
[September 1, 1998],” J.A. 138, contractually bound Siemens to 
provide PJS benefits to appellees apart from any specific ERISA 
provision.  At oral argument in support of this contention 
appellees brought to our attention the Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit’s recent decision in Evans v. Sterling Chemicals 
Inc.
 
, 660 F.3d 862 (5th Cir. 2011).   
 But before considering Evans and the rest of the details 
of appellees’ argument that the APA required Siemens to 
provide for PJS benefits for legacy employees terminated after 
August 31, 1998, it is useful to make an overview of the 
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argument.  When Siemens entered into the APA it knew of the 
sunset, successor employer, and termination of employment by 
Westinghouse23 provisions of the Westinghouse Plan.  Thus, if it 
had contractually obligated itself to extend PJS benefits to the 
legacy employees it would have been engaging in a rare, indeed 
inexplicable act of corporate benevolence as it would have been 
lifting three preexisting bars to the legacy employees advancing 
PJS claims after that date.  It is, of course, perfectly obvious that 
Siemens had the exact opposite intent as it unmistakably 
revealed by contracting for the closing date for the purpose of 
pensions and benefits of the APA to be September 1, 1998.  By 
the use of that date Siemens ensured that it would not become 
the employer for ERISA purposes until after the sunset 
provision had eliminated the legacy employees’ potential claims 
for PJS benefits.24
 
 
Having completed our overview we now address Evans
                                                 
23 By referencing Westinghouse we are including its subsidiaries 
and participating joint ventures in accordance with the 
Westinghouse Plan. 
.  
 
24 Lest it be thought that we are ascribing to Siemens a 
motivation that it did not have in adopting the September 1, 
1998 closing date we refer to an internal Siemens memorandum 
dated August 12, 1998, that indicated that among the advantages 
of having Siemens “lease” Westinghouse employees until 
August 31, 1998, Siemens “would not need to even include 
Section 19 (PJS) in new pension plan, as it would have expired 
before employees joined Siemens.”  J.A. 477. 
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In Evans, Cytec Industries, Inc., sold a portion of its business to 
Sterling Fibers, Inc., and pursuant to that sale, a number of 
Cytec employees continued employment with Sterling and 
became participants in Sterling’s benefit plans.25  Id. at 864-65.  
Section 5.05(f) of the asset purchase agreement required 
Sterling to provide postretirement medical and life insurance 
benefits to employees who continued employment with Sterling 
on a level at least equal to that of the Cytec Plan and required 
that Sterling obtain the written consent of Cytec prior to 
reducing benefits.  Id. at 865.  Sterling’s Plan, however, did not 
include the relevant consent provision, and, in fact, provided 
that Sterling could amend the plan at any time by action of the 
plan committee.  Id.  Some years after the transaction, Sterling 
entered bankruptcy, and during the course of those proceedings, 
the bankruptcy court approved Sterling’s “rejection” of the 
purchase agreement as an executory contract.  Id. at 866.  Soon 
thereafter, Sterling raised the transferred employees’ benefit 
premiums beyond the premiums that the Cytec Plan had set 
without Cytec’s written consent.  Id.  at 866-67.  The employees 
sued Sterling, claiming that section 5.05(f) constituted a valid 
amendment to the Sterling Plan but not an executory contract, 
and thus it could not be rejected during the bankruptcy 
proceedings.  Id.
 
 at 868.   
Relying on its holding in a similar case, 
                                                 
25There were three related companies all including the name 
“Cytec” and it is unclear which one or whether they all made the 
sale to Sterling.  The point, however, is not significant and as a 
matter of convenience we refer to one of the companies, Cytec 
Industries, as the vendor. 
Halliburton Co. 
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Benefits Committee v. Graves, 463 F.3d 360 (5th Cir. 2006), the 
court of appeals determined that section 5.05(f) of the asset 
purchase agreement constituted a valid amendment under 
ERISA of Sterling’s benefit plan and that Sterling thus was 
required to abide by the terms of that provision.  660 F.3d at 
874.  In this regard, the court concluded that although the asset 
purchase agreement was extrinsic to the Sterling Plan and the 
provision itself was not included within the plan, the agreement 
constituted a valid plan amendment because the agreement was 
in writing, contained a provision directed to an ERISA plan, and 
the purchase agreement otherwise satisfied the formal procedure 
required for a plan amendment under the Sterling Plan.  Id.
 
 at 
871-72. 
Appellees’ reliance on Evans
 
 is misplaced.  What 
appellees fail to recognize is that even if we were to conclude 
that the APA constituted a valid plan amendment of the Siemens 
Plans (a remarkable conclusion as they were not so incidentally 
non-extant as of the APA’s execution) or that the APA 
otherwise defined Siemens’ ERISA obligations, there is no 
provision within the APA requiring that Siemens provide PJS 
benefits to appellees, and, as we have indicated, it has not done 
so.  Thus, Westinghouse and Siemens simply did not make an 
agreement providing for the extension of PJS benefits to the 
legacy employees.   
 In relevant part, paragraph 5.5(d)(iv) of the APA 
provides that Siemens “shall be solely responsible for . . . any 
benefits pursuant to Section 19 [the PJS provision] of the 
[Westinghouse] Pension Plan and the corresponding provision 
of the Siemens Pension Plan” with respect to legacy employees 
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after September 1, 1998, J.A. 139-40, but we already have 
concluded that appellees are not entitled to PJS benefits under 
section 19 of the Westinghouse Pension Plan.  Although 
paragraph 5.5(d)(iv) may assume that Siemens would enact a 
corresponding PJS benefits provision, it does not require 
Siemens to do so and thus differs from the purchase agreement 
provisions at issue in Evans and Halliburton.26  Cf. Evans
                                                 
26Siemens argues that the APA contains language referencing a 
corresponding PJS benefit provision in the Siemens Plans 
because that language was drafted at a time when the parties 
believed that the transaction would close before the effective 
date of the sunset provision in the Westinghouse Plan.  Under 
that belief that ultimately proved to be mistaken with respect to 
pensions and benefits, Siemens represents now that, to be in 
conformity with the Westinghouse Plan, it did intend to provide 
PJS benefits under its plans to the legacy employees from the 
date of closing through August 31, 1998, and the portion of 
paragraph 5.5(d)(iv) that implies that Siemens would provide 
PJS benefits is a vestige of that belief.  Thus, Siemens views the 
language as contractually obsolete.  While the long delay in 
completing the PGBU transaction suggests that Siemens’ 
contention may be true, our conclusion regarding the import of 
the APA does not mean that we are accepting Siemens’ 
representation for the reason of the mention of PJS benefits in 
the APA.   
, 660 
F.3d at 865 (“[Sterling] shall continue to provide postretirement 
medical and life insurance benefits for such [qualifying] 
Acquired Employee[s] that are no less favorable to such 
Acquired Employee[s] than those benefits provided by [Cytec] 
under the [Cytec benefit plans] . . . and [Sterling] shall not 
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reduce the level of such benefits without the prior written 
consent of [Cytec] . . . .”); Halliburton
 
, 463 F.3d at 365 
(“[Halliburton] shall . . . take all corporation action necessary to: 
(i) maintain with respect to eligible participants . . . the 
[acquired company’s] retiree medical plan, except to the extent 
that any modifications thereto are consistent with changes in the 
medical plans provided by [Halliburton] and its subsidiaries for 
similarly situated active employees . . . .”).   
Appellees’ invocation of paragraph 5.5(d)(i) is likewise 
unavailing.  That provision required that Siemens “establish a 
defined benefit pension plan . . . that contains terms and 
conditions that are substantially identical with respect to all 
substantive provisions to those of the Westinghouse Pension 
Plan as in effect as of [September 1, 1998].”  J.A. 138 (emphasis 
added).  We already have noted that paragraph 5.5(a)(ii), which 
requires Siemens to “provide compensation and benefit plans 
and arrangements which in the aggregate are comparable . . . to 
the compensation, Plans and Benefit Arrangements,” of the 
Westinghouse Plan, id. 137 (emphasis added), supersedes 
paragraph 5.5(d)(i) to the extent they set forth disparate 
standards governing Siemens’ pension obligations.  As we 
observed previously, the amendment to the APA that changed 
the closing date to September 1, 1998, for pension and benefit 
purposes did not specifically include section 5.5(a), and the 
closing date for purposes of section 5.5(a) thus technically 
remained August 19, 1998.  On that date, the Westinghouse Plan 
included the sunset provision, which provided that “[i]n no 
event shall a Permanent Job Separation occur after August 31, 
1998.”  Id. 293.  Thus, even if we contorted section 5.5(a)’s “in 
the aggregate comparable” standard to require adherence to all 
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terms of the Westinghouse Plan, including the PJS benefits 
provision, section 5.5(a) would have required that Siemens offer 
PJS benefits to the legacy employees only through August 31, 
1998.  As the parties agree that Siemens did not terminate a 
legacy employee prior to September 1, 1998, Siemens’ failure to 
offer PJS benefits from August 19, 1998 to August 31, 1998, did 
not deprive any legacy employee of benefits to which they were 
entitled.   
 
If we focus on paragraph 5.5(d)(i), as appellees urge, the 
closing date of the APA for that paragraph was changed to 
September 1, 1998.  As of September 1, 1998, the Westinghouse 
Plan still included the sunset provision.  As complicated as this 
case might be, on this point the English language meaning of the 
Westinghouse Plan could not be clearer.  Accordingly, even if 
we were to conclude that the APA constituted an amendment of 
the Siemens Plans or otherwise imposed upon Siemens pension 
obligations independent of any specific ERISA provision 
requiring that Siemens provide PJS benefits, paragraph 5.5(d)(i) 
of the APA did not require Siemens to provide PJS benefits to 
the legacy employees, because section 5.5(d) defines Siemens’ 
pension obligations in relation to the Westinghouse Pension 
Plan as of September 1, 1998, and as of September 1, 1998, a 
permanent job separation could not occur under the 
Westinghouse Plan by virtue of the sunset provision.27
                                                 
27 On September 9, 1998, Westinghouse retroactively amended 
its plan to provide, among other things, a new date by which PJS 
benefits would be eliminated under the sunset provision.  See 
J.A. 107 (Joint Statement of Undisputed Facts).  The September 
9 amendment, which was retroactively effective as of August 
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 Appellees nonetheless urge that because we held in 
Bellas
                                                                                                             
31, 1998, provided that “[i]n no event shall a Permanent Job 
Separation occur after April 30, 2000.”  J.A. 466 (Amendment 
to the Westinghouse Plan).  The parties agree that Siemens did 
not participate in Westinghouse’s decision to enact this 
amendment, see J.A. 107, and appellees do not contend that 
Westinghouse’s independent amendment of its plan bound 
Siemens.  Nevertheless, we observe that although the September 
9 amendment was retroactively effective to August 31, 1998, 
and paragraph 5.5(d)(i) provided that Siemens would offer a 
pension plan substantively identical to the Westinghouse Plan as 
of September 1, 1998, Westinghouse’s unilateral retroactive 
amendment to its plan more than a week after September 1, 
1998, did not alter Siemens’ contractual undertaking in 
paragraph 5.5(d)(i) of the APA.  By the plain terms of the 
Westinghouse Plan as they existed on September 1, 1998, the 
date Siemens was required to reference under paragraph 
5.5(d)(i), PJS benefits were no longer available under the 
Westinghouse Plan by virtue of the original sunset provision, 
which eliminated those benefits following August 31, 1998.   
 that the sunset provision was an illegal cutback under 
ERISA, Westinghouse’s liability for PJS benefits extending past 
August 31, 1998 existed “as a matter of law” at the time of the 
APA’s execution.  Appellees’ br. at 13.  They contend that the 
sunset provision thus could not have limited Siemens’ promise 
to provide substantially identical benefits.  But as we have 
explained the legacy employees are not entitled to PJS benefits 
from Siemens without regard to the sunset provision and thus 
the invalidation of the sunset provision is of no help to them.  In 
any event, we do not agree with appellees’ expansive view of 
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the effect of Bellas
 
 on this point.   
We recognize that nearly one year after the execution of 
the APA, the District Court for the Western District of 
Pennsylvania held that the sunset provision violated section 
204(g), see Bellas v. CBS, Inc., 73 F. Supp. 2d 500 (W.D. Pa. 
1999), and one year later we affirmed that disposition, see 
Bellas, 221 F.3d at 517.  We grant that at the time of the APA’s 
execution, Westinghouse was nonetheless legally obligated 
under ERISA to allow for a permanent job separation to take 
place following August 31, 1998, notwithstanding the 
Westinghouse Plan’s plain language to the contrary which 
neither we nor the district court yet had struck down.  The terms 
of the Westinghouse Plan, however, did not obligate 
Westinghouse to provide PJS benefits after August 31, 1998, 
and it is the terms of the Westinghouse Plan measured as of 
September 1, 1998 — not Westinghouse’s underlying ERISA 
obligations — that Siemens promised effectively to match in the 
APA.  See J.A. 138 (“substantially identical with respect to all 
substantive provisions to those of the Westinghouse Pension 
Plan as in effect of [September 1, 1998]”).  Considering that 
those terms had not yet been called into question by Bellas
 
, we 
find that our holding in that case cannot alter the plain language 
of the APA.   
Fundamentally, the APA is a contract.  A basic principle 
of contract construction is that we must interpret and enforce 
unambiguous agreements according to their terms.  See 
McDowell v. Philadelphia Hous. Auth., 423 F.3d 233, 238 (3d 
Cir. 2005); Morais v. Central Beverage Corp. Union Emps.’ 
Supplemental Retirement Plan, 167 F.3d 709, 712 (1st Cir. 
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1999) (“[C]ontracts containing unambiguous language must be 
construed according to their plain and natural meaning[.]”) 
(quoting Smart v. Gillette Co. Long-Term Disability Plan, 70 
F.3d 173, 178 (1st Cir. 1995)).28  In no uncertain terms, Siemens 
agreed to provide benefits “substantially identical to” those 
provided under the Westinghouse Plan as of September 1, 1998, 
and the Westinghouse Plan did not provide PJS benefits for 
employees terminated after August 31, 1998, even putting aside 
the fact that it did not ever require Westinghouse to pay benefits 
to employees terminated by a successor employer.  Our later 
invalidation of the sunset provision as to Westinghouse could 
not change the parameters of Siemens’ contractual undertaking 
either with respect to the termination date of the separations for 
PJS eligibility or
 
 with respect to the entity terminating the 
employment, i.e., a Westinghouse employer.  Nor, of course, 
could it change the Westinghouse Plan’s provision that there 
would not be a permanent job separation of an employee offered 
continued employment by a successor employer.     
 In short, there are three separate reasons why appellees 
are not entitled to PJS benefits from Siemens: (1) the sunset 
                                                 
28Because the APA is a contract that “potentially affects rights 
protected by [ERISA] . . . [it] is likely subject to interpretation in 
accordance with tenets of federal common law.”  Smart, 70 F.3d 
at 178 (citing Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 56, 
107 S.Ct. 1549, 1557 (1987)); cf. Morais, 167 F.3d at 711 (“[I]t 
is well settled that federal common law applies both to interpret 
the provisions of an ERISA benefit plan and to resolve ‘[i]ssues 
of relinquishment of rights and waiver’ when such side 
agreements affect the benefits provided by an ERISA plan.”).   
 
 77 
provision cut-off date of August 31, 1998; (2) the provision that 
the terminating employer had to be a Westinghouse affiliate; and 
(3) the provision that there would not be a permanent job 
separation if a successor employer offered employment to a 
terminated employee.  If somehow in a way beyond our 
conception the APA could be deemed to have been modified by 
our invalidation of the sunset provision in Bellas
 
, the remaining 
two bars nevertheless would remain in place to the end that 
appellees could not obtain PJS benefits from Siemens.  Thus, as 
complicated as this case seems to be in the end the result that we 
must reach is quite clear. 
 
 
VI.  SUMMARY 
 
In summary, we hold that appellees are not entitled to 
PJS benefits from Siemens.  First, we conclude that Siemens did 
not adopt the Westinghouse Pension Plan as an ERISA 
“transition” plan from August 19 to August 31, 1998, and thus 
did not violate section 204(g) when it adopted the Siemens 
Plans, which lacked PJS benefits.  Second, we conclude that 
because appellees had not satisfied the conditions for PJS 
benefits upon a hypothetical termination just prior to 
Westinghouse’s transfer of liabilities to Siemens and could not 
satisfy in the future the conditions for those benefits, sections 
204(g) and 208 did not protect those benefits from cutback and 
appellees’ benefits would not have included PJS benefits upon 
Westinghouse Plan’s hypothetical termination.  Consequently, 
Siemens’ omission of PJS benefits from its Plans and appellees’ 
resulting lack of entitlement to PJS benefits under Siemens 
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Plans upon a hypothetical termination basis just following the 
transfer of liabilities did not diminish appellees’ benefits in 
violation of section 208.  Finally, we conclude that Siemens did 
not obligate itself in the APA to provide PJS benefits to the 
legacy employees.  Finding no ERISA provision that requires 
otherwise, we must enforce the Siemens Plans as written, and 
beyond any reasonable dispute those Plans do not entitle 
appellees to PJS benefits.    
 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the District 
Court’s March 30, 2007 order to the extent that it denied 
Siemens’ summary judgment and granted appellees summary 
judgment.  Because we conclude that none of the appellees are 
entitled to PJS benefits from Siemens, we need not reach the 
questions certified for interlocutory appeal regarding the validity 
of the Release Plaintiffs’ waivers as they did not have any PJS 
benefits to waive and we thus dismiss the certified interlocutory 
appeals.  We likewise need not address appellees’ related 
contention that the District Court erred in denying appellees’ 
claim that they were entitled to retiree medical and life insurance 
benefits that they contended must accompany PJS benefits as 
there are no PJS benefits to accompany and we will dismiss the 
appeal relating to that issue.  In sum, Siemens is entitled to 
summary judgment as to both the Release and the Non-Release 
Plaintiffs, i.e., all appellees, and we therefore will remand the 
case to the District Court to enter summary judgment for 
Siemens and for the Siemens Plans.  The entry of that order will 
terminate this litigation on the substantive matters in issue.   
